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ABSTRACT
A significant gap in the ADA’s protections lingers even after the
ADA Amendments Act of 2008: whether individuals are protected
from disability discrimination if their impairment lasted six months
or less but was nonetheless the basis for some type of adverse
employment or other action. The ADA does not explicitly exclude
all short-term impairments, and the EEOC’s regulations provide
they can be an actual disability if they are “sufficiently severe.”
Without any further definition, not surprisingly perhaps, courts invoke
reasoning similar to what they employed prior to the ADAAA’s course
correction in 2008, primarily focusing on duration as a measure of
the impairment’s severity and dismissing significant limitations as
“trivial.” This is inconsistent with several of the ADAAA’s Rules of
Construction. Relatedly, plaintiffs alleging short-term impairments
under the “regarded as” prong frequently see their claims dismissed
because the ADAAA excludes “transitory and minor” perceived
impairments. Congress defined transitory—six months or less—but
left minor to be interpreted by the courts. As with the actual disability
cases, courts in the “transitory and minor” cases are finding
impairments that are objectively more than trivial to nonetheless be
minor. There is no discernable principle for what makes one impairment
minor but not another, other than vague analogies to infected fingers
and seasonal flues. This Article argues that many short-term impairments
are indistinguishable in any meaningful way from other protected
impairments and individuals alleging such impairments are entitled
to the full scope of ADA protections.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2008, Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments
Act (ADAAA) to correct undue judicial narrowing of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), directing courts to focus on the merits of disability
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discrimination claims rather than the threshold issue of disability.1 Courts
appear to have taken this mandate seriously in many respects.2 Nonetheless,
a significant number of individuals are routinely excluded from the ADA’s
protections despite experiencing adverse employment actions based on a
physical or mental impairment or the perception of one. Two present day
hypotheticals illustrate this.
In the first, Mei, an employee of LMN Health Care, travels home to
China once a year to visit her family. Unfortunately, in late 2019, Mei
was exposed to the Covid-19 virus during her travels, was hospitalized,
and she spent two months in recovery. Her employer terminated her when
he learned of her condition. Mei sued her employer under the ADA, alleging
that her Covid-19 infection was a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limited one or more of her major life activities.3 The court
dismissed her claim because she recovered in less than six months. In the
second hypothetical, Mei did not actually contract the virus, but her employer
fired her because he believed anyone who travels to China is likely to be
contagious. Mei brought suit alleging that her employer regarded her as
having a disability under the ADA.4 The court dismissed this claim because
it found her employer did not regard her as actually having an impairment
at the time it decided to discharge her, and even if it did, the impairment
would have been only transitory and minor.5
Under either scenario, each invoking a different part of the ADA, the court
found Mei could not meet the statutory threshold of showing she has
a disability. This is despite that in the former case, the virus landed her in
the hospital, and in the latter case, the employer viewed her as physically
unable to safely perform her work.6 In either case, the stigma is the same;
1. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–325, § 2(b)(5), 122 Stat.
3553 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213) (“[I]t is the intent of Congress
that the primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether
entities covered under the ADA have complied with their obligations, and to convey that
the question of whether an individual’s impairment is a disability under the ADA should
not demand extensive analysis . . . .”).
2. See Nicole Buonocore Porter, The New ADA Backlash, 82 TENN. L. REV. 1, 19
(2014) (concluding that courts have taken Congress’s directives seriously and more cases
find plaintiffs to have a disability under the ADAAA).
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A).
4. See id. § 12102(1)(C).
5. See id. § 12102(3)(B).
6. Some employees diagnosed with a virus, such as Covid-19, may be fired for the
diagnosis alone or for the fact they seek reasonable accommodations for the physical
consequences of the disease. Studies show that even individuals with mild Covid-19 cases
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Mei was discharged because of a real or perceived impairment related
to Covid-19.
Although the recent Covid-19 pandemic has brought the ADA’s coverage
of short-term impairment into sharper relief, the issues are not unique to
that context.7 The hypotheticals were inspired by an actual case in which
an employer fired an employee out of fear that she had been exposed to the
Ebola virus while traveling in Africa.8 Plaintiffs have also unsuccessfully
sought relief under the ADA for adverse employment actions based on

may experience long lasting effects, which has been deemed Long Covid Syndrome. See
Francis Collins, Trying to Make Sense of Long COVID Syndrome, NIH DIR.’S BLOG (Jan.
19, 2021), https://directorsblog.nih.gov/2021/01/19/trying-to-make-sense-of-long-covidsyndrome/ [https://perma.cc/7JP8-4VYH] (summarizing studies showing the lasting effects of
Covid-19 infection). It is not clear whether these employees will be protected from
discrimination under the ADA. In the early months of the coronavirus pandemic, the
EEOC declined to say whether Covid-19 itself was an ADA disability. Transcript of
March 27, 2020 Outreach Webinar, U.S. EQUAL E MP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://
www.eeoc.gov/transcript-march-27-2020-outreach-webinar [https://perma.cc/UWW8WXLW] (“Here is what the EEOC can say now. This is a very new virus and while medical
experts are learning more about it, there is still much that is unknown. Therefore, it is
unclear at this time whether COVID-19 is or could be a disability under the ADA.”).
7. Denying protections for short-term impairments is also not a workplaceexclusive concern. Most cases arise out of employment, but both the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act apply the same definition of disability to prohibit discrimination
in government programs, services, and activities—including such diverse things as public
education and operation of prisons—and private businesses. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131–
12165 (applying the definition to public entities); id. §§ 12181–12189 (applying the
definition to places of public accommodation and commercial facilities); see also 29
U.S.C. § 794(b) (defining programs and activities that, if they receive federal financial
assistance, are prohibited from discriminating based on disability). For example, a federal
court dismissed a prisoner’s ADA Title II discrimination claim, based on his injured ankle,
because he did not show a permanent or long-term impairment. See Shaw v. Williams, No.
16-CV-1065, 2018 WL 3740665, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2018); cf. Claudia Irizarry Aponte,
Cast Adrift by the Virus, the Newly Homeless Seek a Place to Recover, CITY (Apr. 1, 2020,
8:50 PM), https://thecity.nyc/2020/04/cast-adrift-by-the-virus-the-newly-homeless-seeka-refuge.html [https://perma.cc/N5S7-5V4P] (describing a landlord who threw out a tenant
because he tested positive for Covid-19).
8. See Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. STME, LLC, 938 F.3d 1305, 1318 (11th
Cir. 2019) (granting employer’s motion to dismiss). Similar fears are easy to envision
given findings of increased contagiousness of various Covid-19 variants and data showing
that asymptomatic unvaccinated individuals can spread the disease. See, e.g., Nicholas G.
Davies et al., Estimated Transmissibility and Impact of SARS-CoV-2 Lineage B.1.1.7 in
England, SCIENCE (Apr. 9, 2021), https://science.sciencemag.org/content/372/6538/eabg
3055 [https://perma.cc/UQ3D-6KBT] (describing the increased transmissibility of certain
Covid-19 variants).
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their having contracted H1N1, swine flu, 9 broken limbs, 10 pregnancy
complications,11 conditions requiring surgery,12 and other impairments
that resolved in six months or less but were functionally limiting while active.13
Occasionally courts have found claims based on short-term impairments
sufficient to meet the disability threshold.14 More commonly, however,
courts read the ADAAA restrictively to exclude most short-term impairments
despite the Amendments Act’s intent to create a broad definition of disability
that in most cases should require little demanding inquiry.15
By design, the ADA does not protect everyone. The broad premise
of the ADA is rooted in the social model of disability, which finds disability
to be the result of societal attitudes and environmental barriers rather than
merely a personal problem to be overcome by the individual. 16 But, as

9. See Lewis v. Fla. Default L. Grp., P.L., No. 8:10-CV-1182-T-27EAJ, 2011 WL
4527456, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 16, 2011) (finding the plaintiff had neither an actual nor
perceived disability); Valdez v. Minn. Quarries, Inc., No. 12-CV-0801 (PJS/TNL), 2012
WL 6112846, at *3 (D. Minn. Dec. 10, 2012) (finding the plaintiff failed to establish a
perceived disability claim).
10. See Zick v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, No. 11 Civ. 5093(CM), 2012
WL 4785703, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2012) (finding an employee could not show a
“regarded as” claim under the ADA for her broken leg that had an eight-to-ten-week recovery
period).
11. See Love v. First Transit, Inc., No. 16-CV-2208, 2017 WL 1022191, at *6 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 16, 2017) (suggesting that the plaintiff’s miscarriage was not a pregnancy-related
disability because the miscarriage itself was over within one day and the plaintiff alleged
no history of complications leading up to it).
12. See Mastrio v. Eurest Servs., Inc., No. 3:13-CV-00564 (VLB), 2014 WL
840229, at *5–6 (D. Conn. Mar. 4, 2014) (finding kidney stones that required multiple
hospitalizations and surgeries over the course of a month did not rise to a disability under
the ADA); Butler v. BTC Foods Inc., No. 12-492, 2012 WL 5315034, at *1 (E.D. Penn.
Oct. 19, 2012) (holding that double hernia that required a six week leave of absence after
surgery was not a disability under the ADA).
13. See infra Part III. These cases are different from those involving certain types
of impairments, such as cancer, to which courts have applied a new rule of construction
that directs courts to consider impairments in remission as if they were active. See 42
U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D) (“An impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it
would substantially limit a major life activity when active.”). As will be discussed infra
Part III.C, some courts have refused to apply § 12102(4)(D) to short-term impairments, at
least where the court is not persuaded to consider the potential for recurrence.
14. See, e.g., Judge v. Landscape Forms, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-1117, 2014 WL 12502685,
at *5 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 6, 2014) (finding a torn bicep sufficiently severe to avoid summary
judgment because the employee was subject to four months of workplace restrictions).
15. See supra note 1.
16. See Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621,
653 (1999) (“In contrast to the medical model of disability, which views disadvantages as
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Professor Samuel Bagenstos has explained, within the social model the
statute reflects a tension between a universalist approach that would cover
everyone and a minority rights approach that protects only certain individuals.17
The ADA ultimately took the latter approach, stating in its original findings
and purposes that people with disabilities are a discrete and insular
minority.18 The limitation was a political compromise by the Act’s supporters
to overcome business and conservative objections to the universal approach.19
In other words, the degree to which a universalist approach would intrude
on employer decision-making, not the absence of stigma associated with
certain impairments, explained the Act’s limited coverage.20
When Congress revisited the ADA in 2008 to correct judicial misconstruction,
it kept the minority rights approach by still not covering everyone.21 To
the extent there was discussion of short-term impairments, that discussion
was about conditions that would have no or only very trivial functional
limitations. For example, the House Judiciary Committee Report references
flowing naturally from a defect located in an individual, the social model of disability sees
disadvantages as flowing from social systems and structures.”).
17. SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 44–45 (2009) (describing the tension between the universalist model,
which would cover everyone, and the minority rights model, which covers only a particular
group).
18. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2(a)(7), 104
Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7)). Professor Bagenstos points
out how the minority rights model inevitably led to courts “policing the line” between who
has a disability and who does not. BAGENSTOS, supra note 17, at 47; see also Matthew
Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 19, 39 (2000) (“[Characterizing individuals with disabilities as a] discrete and
insular minority . . . invites judges to view the problem of disability narrowly rather than
broadly. In reality, the problems addressed by the ADA are experienced by a wide-ranging
and amorphous spectrum of people.”).
19. BAGENSTOS, supra note 17, at 44–45 (describing how the original ADA acceded
to objections to the universalist approach). But see Kevin Barry, Toward Universalism:
What the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Can and Can’t Do for Disability Rights, 31
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 203, 207 (2010) (agreeing that the social model permits both
the minority rights and universalist approach, but disagreeing that there was an overt political
compromise where the universalist model was abandoned).
20. BAGENSTOS, supra note 17, at 53 (suggesting a universalist approach would have
imposed a rationality requirement on all employer decisions).
21. See Barry, supra note 19, at 208. Kevin Barry, who was on the legislative legal
team that negotiated the ADAAA’s language, described the scope of that Act as still not
covering everyone:
The ADAAA resolves the original tension by striking a balance between the
universal and minority group approaches, thereby bringing coherence to a statute
long misunderstood. Specifically, the ADAAA provides nearly universal
nondiscrimination protection under the ADA’s “regarded as” prong, and it extends
reasonable accommodations under the first and second prongs to a broader but
not unlimited group of people whose impairments are stigmatized.
Id.
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a “misapplication of resources” for conditions like the common cold and
the seasonal flu.22 The floor debate mentioned other supposedly trivial
conditions, such as stomach aches, mild seasonal allergies, and hangnails.23
These examples read like shorthand for conditions that seldom result in any
significant functional limitations. Indeed, Representative Jerry Nadler, in
his comments supporting the passage of the ADAA, observed that, “I have
yet to see a case where the ADA covered an individual with a hangnail.”24
Perhaps that is correct, that there are conditions with effects too trivial to
warrant disability protection, but to agree with that does support a general
rule that short-term impairments, even those that in their acute stage are
substantially limiting, fall outside the ADA’s scope. Nonetheless, that is how
courts have interpreted the statute, as this Article will show.
To be clear, the statute does not explicitly exclude short-term impairments
from the definition of disability under the first two prongs, the actual and
“record of” prongs,25 and creates only a narrow an exception under the
perceived disability prong, also known as the “regarded as” prong, for
short-term impairments that are both transitory and minor.26 As will be
discussed in more detail in the next section, the regulations implementing
the Act indicate that an impairment lasting less than six months can be an
actual disability “if sufficiently severe.”27 This marks a broadening of the
EEOC’s original ADA regulations, which stated more definitively that
certain short-term conditions would not meet the threshold definition.28
Nonetheless, many courts continue to assert a durational threshold for any
impairment.29 There is little judicial explanation why duration should be

22. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 2, at 18 (2008).
23. 154 CONG. REC. H6064 (daily ed. June 25, 2008) (statement of Rep. Nadler).
24. Id.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)–(B).
26. Id. § 12102(3)(B). “Transitory” means “an actual or expected duration of 6
months or less.” Id. Courts, with help from the EEOC, have particularly muddled this
prong because the exception also requires them to find the impairment “minor.” See id.
Courts have either conflated minor with the transitory nature of the impairment or
disregarded it as a separate element altogether. See infra Part IV.
27. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) (2020).
28. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j) (1991) (“[T]emporary, non-chronic impairments
of short duration, with little or no long-term or permanent impact, are usually not
disabilities.”).
29. See, e.g., Orr v. City of Rogers, 232 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1065 n.6 (W.D. Ark.
2017) (finding that the plaintiff’s claim regarding her broken leg was a close case that only
avoided dismissal because of “unique circumstances” involving corrective surgery that
impaired her ability to work for a full year); see also infra Part III.
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the controlling variable, especially when in some cases, courts acknowledge
the short-term impairments in question created significant restrictions on
major life activities while they were active.30
Borrowing from economic theory, duration is a sticky variable.31 The
ADAAA made many changes to how courts approach the threshold question
of disability, but it has not had a sufficiently meaningful effect on how
courts view short-term impairments.32 This Article argues that the ADA
protects individuals from discrimination based on actual impairments that
are substantially limiting while they are active, and perceived impairments
that defendants mistakenly believed to be more than objectively trivial,
regardless of whether the plaintiff fully recovers from the impairment in
a fairly short period of time. Courts are erroneously following patterns
similar to their pre-ADAAA decisions, and the result is a substantial and
unwarranted gap in the ADA’s anti-discrimination protections.
Part II of this Article briefly covers the statutory, regulatory, and legislative
history’s treatment of short-term impairments. Part III looks at actual
disability claims involving short-term impairments. Part IV looks at “regarded
as” claims also involving short-term impairments. Part V offers a critique
of how courts have created an unwarranted broad exclusion of short-term
impairments. Finally, Part VI offers an alternative approach that is more
in line with the stated purposes of the ADAAA.

30. See, e.g., Mastrio v. Eurest Servs., Inc., No. 3:13-CV-00564, 2014 WL 840229,
at *5 (D. Conn. Mar. 4, 2014) (finding the plaintiff had a physical impairment that
substantially limited his ability to work and walk but concluding that he failed to state a
claim because his impairment was short-term).
31.
In economics terms, stickiness refers to variables that are resistant to change, a
concept generally attributed to John Maynard Keynes. See, e.g., George A. Hanson & E.E.
Keenan, Lifting All Boats: The Case for Wage and Hour Enforcement in Recessionary
Times, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 454, 457 n.24 (“The theory of sticky wages was promoted
by John Maynard Keynes.”). Some commentators have applied the concept to describe
how the law can be resistant to change. See Bertrall L. Ross II, Embracing Administrative
Constitutionalism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 519, 556 (2015) (“Constitutional applications are thus
resistant to future adjustments unless the constitutional principle itself is changed. This
stickiness of judicial constitutional applications ultimately limits constitutional adaptation
to new societal contexts.”).
32. Courts frequently reject impairments, unless they last longer than six months,
regardless of whether those impairments, either actually or as perceived by the employer,
otherwise substantially limit major life activities. See, e.g., White v. Interstate Distrib. Co.,
438 F. App’x 415, 420 (6th Cir. 2011) (reasoning that regardless of how the employer
might have perceived the significance of the plaintiff’s impairment in a “regarded as”
disability claim, what mattered was that the impairment resolved in less than six months);
Shaw v. Williams, No. 16-CV-1065, 2018 WL 3740665, at *8–9 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2018)
(dismissing an ADA claim because the plaintiff failed to present evidence that the effects
of his impairment lasted longer than six months).
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II. STATUTORY LANGUAGE, REGULATORY GUIDANCE, AND
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The overall history of the ADA shows Congress intended the Act to
cover disorders and conditions from which people recover if, while they
are in their active state, those impairments cause substantial functional
limitations.33 The congressional debate on the ADAAA singled out how
courts applying the ADA’s original language erroneously characterized
certain impairments as “too temporary and short-lived to qualify . . . for
protection.”34 Congress added rules of construction to reverse judicial
rejection of impairments that occurred only episodically or were in remission.35
While the ADAAA retained elements that would exclude truly minor
conditions, the Judiciary Committee’s report states they were intended to
be construed narrowly to exclude only those impairments that were at the
“lowest end of the spectrum of severity.”36 Overarching the entire Act,
Congress exhorted courts to give their “primary attention” to the merits of
ADA claims and “not demand extensive analysis” of the threshold question
of disability.37
The ADA defines disability three ways: “(A) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of
such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded
as having such an impairment . . . .”38 The ADA did not define “impairment.”39
33. Two of the most significant sections of the ADAAA affirming this intent are
the rules of construction that direct courts to evaluate episodic impairments and impairments in
remission while in their active state, 42 U.SC. § 12102(4)(D), and to not consider the effects of
ameliorative effects of medications and other mitigating measures, id. § 12102(4)(E)(i).
34. 154 CONG. REC. 19434 (2008) (giving an example of a nurse who died a few
months after a court found her breast cancer too temporary and short-lived to qualify as a
disability under the ADA).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D).
36. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 2, at 18 (2008) (expressing intent that the
exception for transitory and minor impairments under the “regarded as” prong applies
narrowly only to “claims at the lowest end of the spectrum of severity”). As examples of
what would be at that lower rung, Representative Nadler noted during the floor debate that
other legislators had raised concerns about “stomachaches, the common cold, mild seasonal
allergies, or even a hangnail.” 154 CONG. REC. H6064 (daily ed. June 25, 2008) (statement
of Rep. Nadler).
37. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(5), 122 Stat. 3553
(2008).
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). The first prong is typically referred to as the “actual”
disability prong, the second as the “record of” prong, and the third the “regarded as” prong.
39. See id.
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The legislative history shows that while Congress was concerned about
extending the Act to cover minor and trivial impairments, this concern was
not tied to how long the impairment lasted. The House of Representative’s
Report coupled “minor” with “trivial”: “A person with a minor, trivial
impairment, such as a simple infected finger is not impaired in a major life
activity.”40 This sentence is followed by an explanation that individuals must
show their “important life activities are restricted” as compared to “most
people.”41 In context, the report treats minor and trivial impairments as those
lacking functional limitation; as opposed to impairments with substantial,
or important, limitations, which do.42 Duration is mentioned as only one
of three alternative ways that a person can be substantially limited: “the
conditions, manner or duration” under which [important life activities]
can be performed.”43
The EEOC subsequently filled in the definitional gap broadly:
Physical or mental impairment means (1) Any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more body systems, such as neurological,
musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs),
cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, immune, circulatory,
hemic, lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as an intellectual disability
(formerly termed “mental retardation”), organic brain syndrome, emotional
or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.44

This definition was drawn verbatim from the Rehabilitation Act’s longstanding regulations defining “handicapped person.”45 It is reasonable to
conclude Congress approved of the broad scope of that definition46 because
the Amendments Act stated its purpose was to correct both the judiciary

40. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52–53 (1989), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 334.
41. Id.
42. See id.
43. Id. The House used the phrase “important life activities” here rather than major
life activities. See id.
44. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2019).
45. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (2020); see also Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v.
Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 194 (2002) (noting that the Rehabilitation Act regulations date
back to 1977), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325,
122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
46. Although it criticized Toyota Motor Manufacturing’s treatment of “substantially
limits,” in the ADAAA’s findings and purposes Congress did not state any concerns about
how the Court defined impairment and its reliance on the Rehabilitation Act regulations.
See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, §§ 2(a)(7), (b)(4)–(5), 122 Stat.
3553 (2008) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101).
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and the EEOC47 and, while Congress added a definition of “major life
activities,”48 as well as a set of rules of construction regarding whether an
impairment substantially limits one of those major life activities, it did not
address “impairment.”49
47. Id. (stating the expectation that the EEOC will revise its regulations which
would set the standard for “substantially limits” to reflect the lessened burden articulated
by the ADAAA).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Section 12102(2) provides:
(A) In general
[M]ajor life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing,
lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking,
communicating, and working.
(B) Major bodily functions
For purposes of paragraph (1), a major life activity also includes the
operation of a major bodily function, including but not limited to, functions
of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological,
brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.
Id.
49. See id. § 12102(4). Section 12102(4) provides:
(A) The definition of disability in this chapter shall be construed in favor of
broad coverage of individuals under this chapter, to the maximum extent
permitted by the terms of this chapter.
(B) The term “substantially limits” shall be interpreted consistently with the
findings and purposes of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008.
(C) An impairment that substantially limits one major life activity need not
limit other major life activities in order to be considered a disability.
(D) An impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would
substantially limit a major life activity when active.
(E)
(i) The determination of whether an impairment substantially limits
a major life activity shall be made without regard to the ameliorative
effects of mitigating measures such as—
(I)
medication, medical supplies, equipment, or appliances, low-vision
devices (which do not include ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses),
prosthetics including limbs and devices, hearing aids and cochlear
implants or other implantable hearing devices, mobility devices,
or oxygen therapy equipment and supplies;
(II) use of assistive technology;
(III) reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids or services; or
(IV) learned behavioral or adaptive neurological modifications.
(ii) The ameliorative effects of the mitigating measures of ordinary
eyeglasses or contact lenses shall be considered in determining
whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity.
(iii) As used in this subparagraph—
(I)
the term “ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses” means lenses
that are intended to fully correct visual acuity or eliminate
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Consistent with the House Report, the EEOC’s Title I regulations
incorporated duration as one factor in determining whether a physical or
mental impairment substantially limited a major life activity.50 Its Interpretive
Guidance went further, however, and identified a list of impairments that
were generally not disabilities because of their duration: “[T]emporary,
non-chronic impairments of short duration, with little or no long-term or
permanent impact, are usually not disabilities. Such impairments may include,
but are not limited to, broken limbs, sprained joints, concussions, appendicitis,
and influenza.”51 Neither the regulations nor the Interpretive Guidance
reference the “minor, trivial” language from the House Report or explain
why the listed impairments such as a broken limb would be “trivial.”
The second prong of the definition, the “record of” a disability prong,
was specifically intended to apply to people who have recovered from
their impairments. The original House of Representatives Report indicates
that the purpose of this prong is to “protect individuals who have recovered
from a physical or mental impairment which previously substantially
limited them in a major life activity” as well as individuals misclassified
as having a substantially limiting impairment.52 Despite that, none of the
legislative or administrative sources have much to say about how it applies to
short-term impairments. Because the “record of” prong incorporated the
actual disability prong’s “substantially limited” standard,53 the EEOC’s
regulations and Interpretive Guidance largely incorporated the same statutory
definition and substance of the legislative history.54 Neither addressed
how this prong applies to short-term impairments or people whose impairments
might have been misclassified as short-term impairments.
The definition’s third prong extended disability to include individuals
who are regarded as having a physical or mental impairment; however,
the plaintiff had to show that the perceived disability was one that would

(II)
Id.

refractive error; and
the term “low-vision devices” means devices that magnify,
enhance, or otherwise augment a visual image.

50. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2) (2020). The regulations set out three factors for assessing
whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity: “(i) The nature and severity of
the impairment; (ii) The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (iii) The
permanent or long-term impact, or the expected permanent or long-term impact of or resulting
from the impairment.” Id.
51. 29 C.F.R app. § 1630.2(j) (2020).
52. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52–53 (1989), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 334–35.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(B) (defining disability to include having a record of an
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity).
54. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (2020); id. app. § 1630.2(k) (2020).
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substantially limit a major life activity.55 The House Report reflects Congress
included this prong to address disability-based animus.56 The Interpretive
Guidance explained that the prong addressed employment decisions based
on “myths, fears and stereotypes” about individuals with disabilities.57
But, because this prong referenced the actual disability prong by requiring
plaintiffs to show they were regarded as having “such” an impairment, all
elements applied to the actual disability prong became part of the courts’
analysis of this prong as well, including the exclusion of short-term
impairments.58 The result was that very few plaintiffs succeeded in raising
“regarded as” claims.59
In 2008, Congress added several rules of construction to assess substantial
limitations to correct the misinterpretation of the first two prongs.60 The
rules most relevant to short-term impairments are that 1) the statute should
be construed broadly in favor of coverage;61 2) episodic impairments or

55. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 3(2)(C), 104
Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C)) (including in the definition
“being regarded as having such an impairment”); Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S.
471, 490 (1999) (“An employer runs afoul of the ADA when it makes an employment
decision based on a physical or mental impairment, real or imagined, that is regarded as
substantially limiting a major life activity.”), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
56. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 30–31 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
445, 453 (“In the employment context, if a person is disqualified on the basis of an actual
or perceived physical or mental condition, and the employer can articulate no legitimate
job-related reason for the rejection, a perceived concern about employing persons with
disabilities would be inferred and the plaintiff could qualify for coverage under the ‘regarded as’
test.”).
57. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(l) (1991) (“Where an employer bases a prohibited
employment action on an actual or perceived impairment that is not ‘transitory and minor,’
the employer regards the individual as disabled, whether or not myths, fears, or stereotypes
about disability motivated the employer’s decision.”).
58. See, e.g., Jurczak v. J & R Schugel Trucking Co., No. 03AP-451, 2003 WL 22999504,
at *5–6 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2003) (finding that the plaintiff’s alleged disability failed
under both the actual and “regarded as” definitions because it was too short-term to be
substantially limiting). In the present case, the plaintiff neither alleged nor presented
evidence that his upper respiratory infection was anything more than a short-term or
temporary physical impairment or that it had any adverse long-term residual effects.
59. See Jeannette Cox, Crossroads and Signposts: The ADA Amendments Act of
2008, 85 IND. L.J. 187, 201 (2010) (discussing how the Supreme Court incorporated its
interpretation of “substantially limits” into the “regarded as” prong, thereby limiting that
prong’s ability to ameliorate the restrictions on the actual disability prong).
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(4).
61. Id. § 12102(4)(A).
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impairments in remission should be evaluated in their active state;62 and
3) impairments should be evaluated without taking into account the
ameliorating effects of mitigating measures.63 Subsequently, the EEOC’s
Interpretive Guidance explained how the agency believes short -term
impairments might substantially limit major life activities:64
[A]n impairment does not have to last for more than six months in order to be
considered substantially limiting under the first or the second prong of the
definition of disability. For example, . . . if an individual has a back impairment
that results in a 20-pound lifting restriction that lasts for several months, he is
substantially limited in the major life activity of lifting, and therefore covered
under the first prong of the definition of disability. At the same time, “[t]he
duration of an impairment is one factor that is relevant in determining whether
the impairment substantially limits a major life activity. Impairments that last
only for a short period of time are typically not covered, although they may be
covered if sufficiently severe.”65

The agency provided no further guidance regarding when something is
“sufficiently severe.”66 The Interpretive Guidance more generally references
parts of various legislative reports that indicate impairments must be “important”
and that “not every impairment will constitute a ‘disability’ within the
meaning of this section.”67 Interestingly, the EEOC initially proposed retaining,
in both its regulations and interpretive guidance, language specifically
stating certain types of impairments, such as the seasonal flu, are generally

62. Id. § 12102(4)(D).
63. Id. § 12102(4)(E)(i).
64. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) (2020) (citing 154 CONG. REC. 13766 (2008)).
65. Id. The explanation is adopted from the Joint Statement of Senators Hoyer and
Sensenbrenner that the ADAAA was not intended to change the original ADA’s consideration
of duration as one factor in assessing substantial limitation under the first two prongs of
the definition:
Second, a concern has been raised about whether the bill changes current law
with respect to the duration that is required for an impairment to substantially
limit a major life activity. The bill makes no change to current law with respect
to this issue. The duration of an impairment is one factor that is relevant in
determining whether the impairment substantially limits a major life activity.
Impairments that last only for a short period of time are typically not covered,
although they may be covered if sufficiently severe.
154 CONG. REC. 13766 (2008).
66. Nathaniel P. Levy, You’re Fired, but Get Well Soon: Temporary Impairments as
ADA Disabilities in Employment Cases, 54 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 547, 581 (2018).
67. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (2020) (“While the limitation imposed by an
impairment must be important, it need not rise to the level of severely restricting or significantly
restricting the ability to perform a major life activity to qualify as a disability.”); 154 CONG.
REC. S8345 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008) (statement of Managers) (“[R]eaffirm[ed] that not
every individual with a physical or mental impairment is covered by the first prong of the
definition of disability in the ADA.”).
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not substantially limiting,68 but removed it from the final version because
it was sufficient to note not every impairment will be a disability.69
In addition to the changes to the first two prongs of the definition,
Congress significantly altered the “regarded as” prong, and for the first and
only time, added an explicit durational limitation.70 A “regarded as” plaintiff
now needs only show that she was regarded as having an impairment:
An individual meets the requirement of “being regarded as having such an
impairment” if the individual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an
action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or perceived physical or
mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit
a major life activity.71

The expanded definition, however, “shall not apply to impairments that
are transitory and minor. A transitory impairment is an impairment with
an actual or expected duration of 6 months or less.”72 The statute does not
define what is a minor impairment.73
The EEOC has made clear that this “minor and transitory” exception
applies only to disability claims arising under the “regarded as” prong.74
The regulations also indicate this exception is an affirmative defense.75
The regulations provide for an objective standard to assess the exception
but, like the statute, they do not further elucidate what is meant by a “minor”
impairment:
To establish this defense, a covered entity must demonstrate that the impairment
is both “transitory” and “minor.” Whether the impairment at issue is or would be
“transitory and minor” is to be determined objectively. A covered entity may not
defeat “regarded as” coverage of an individual simply by demonstrating that it
subjectively believed the impairment was transitory and minor; rather, the covered
entity must demonstrate that the impairment is (in the case of an actual impairment)
or would be (in the case of a perceived impairment) both transitory and minor.

68. 74 Fed. Reg. 48,431, 48,443 (Sept. 23, 2009) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt.
1630).
69. See 76 Fed. Reg. 16,978, 16,981 (Mar. 25, 2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt.
1630).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3).
71. Id. § 12102(3)(A).
72. Id. § 12102(3)(B).
73. See Stephen F. Befort, Let’s Try This Again: The ADA Amendments Act of 2008
Attempts to Reinvigorate the “Regarded As” Prong of the Statutory Definition of Disability,
2010 UTAH L. REV. 993, 1027 (“The Act provides no inkling as to what is meant by a minor
impairment . . . .”).
74. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) (2020).
75. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(f) (2020).
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For purposes of this section, “transitory” is defined as lasting or expected to last
six months or less.76

The accompanying Interpretive Guidance largely relies on the ADAAA’s
legislative reports to explain what is transitory and minor.77 The Senate
Managers’ Statement indicates the transitory and minor exception was added
in response to employer concerns that the third prong eliminated any
functional limitation requirement.78 The House Education and Labor Committee
Report explains that:
[A]bsent this exception, the third prong . . . would have covered individuals
who are regarded as having common ailments like the cold or flu, and this exception
responds to concerns raised by members of the business community regarding
potential abuse of this provision and misapplication of resources on individuals
with minor ailments that last only a short period of time. 79

But the report also reiterates how important the “regarded as” prong is to
ensuring broad protection and that the exception “should be construed
narrowly.”80
The Interpretive Guidance further addresses how to determine whether
the employer perceives an impairment as transitory and minor, using the
example of a person with “an objectively transitory and minor hand wound”
who is fired not for the wound per se, but because the employer mistakenly
believes the wound is the result of HIV infection.81 The perceived HIV
infection would not be transitory and minor and the employer cannot utilize
the transitory and minor defense because that mistaken perception would
be the basis for the employer’s adverse action.82 The EEOC’s hand wound
example follows a similar theme as the legislative history references to
“simple infected finger[s]” and hangnails as examples of minor and trivial
non-covered impairments.83
In sum, the statutory language, regulatory guidance, and legislative history
reflect that short-term impairments are not excluded from the definition

76. Id.
77. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(l) (2020).
78. 154 CONG. REC. S8346 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008) (statement of Managers).
79. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(l) (2020) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at 14
(2008)).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See id.
83. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 2, at 30 (2008) (first citing S. REP. NO. 101-116,
pt. 1, at 23 (1989); and then citing H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990)) (noting
original ADA legislative history about exclusion of trivial impairments such as an infected
finger); 154 CONG. REC. H6064 (daily ed. June 25, 2008) (statement of Rep. Nadler) (“They
worry about covering stomachaches, the common cold, mild seasonal allergies, or even a
hangnail.”).
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of disability unless they have effects so minor that they can be considered
trivial, like a hangnail. Duration is merely one factor in determining both
substantial limitation and the “transitory and minor” exception to the amended
“regarded as” prong. Exclusions to the ADA’s coverage of disabilities should
be construed narrowly. While these sources invite some scrutiny of shortterm impairments, they do not support the level of exclusion that is seen
in the judicial decisions.
III. HOW COURTS HAVE EXCLUDED SHORT-TERM IMPAIRMENTS
UNDER THE ACTUAL DISABILITY PRONG
Although, as discussed, the actual disability prong does not explicitly
exclude minor and transitory impairments, plaintiffs have had a difficult
time proceeding with their actual disability claims based on impairments
that last six months or fewer. This is true even in cases when the functional
limitation of the active impairment was far from trivial.84 There are three
themes that emerge from the cases: 1) courts are elevating duration to the
most important, if not the only important, consideration in evaluating
whether a short-term impairment substantially limits a major life activity;
2) courts are erroneously relying on pre-ADAAA decisions that categorically
excluded short-term impairments; and 3) courts are failing to recognize
the significance of the episodic and mitigating measure rules of construction.
A. Elevating Duration to the Most Important or Only Consideration
As noted above, the ADAAA and EEOC’s regulations and interpretive
guidance require some showing of severity for short-term impairments,
leaving courts to figure out what a “sufficiently severe” short-term impairment
might be. With no further guidance, courts have perhaps unsurprisingly
tended to circle back to duration. 85 The court may acknowledge that a
84. See generally Levy, supra note 66.
85. See, e.g., Leone v. All. Foods, Inc., No. 8:14-CV-800-T-27TBM, 2015 WL 4879406,
at *6 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 14, 2015) (finding that although the plaintiff had identified
significant major life activities limited by his eye injury, it was not substantially limiting
because any limits lasted just over two weeks). This type of reasoning leads to rather
absurd conclusions such as how a miscarriage would not be sufficiently severe enough to
overcome the fact it was “an impairment lasting less than a day.” See Love v. First Transit,
Inc., No. 16-CV-2208, 2017 WL 1022191, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2017). In Love, the court
apparently believed that the plaintiff needed to show a history of complications leading up
to the miscarriage. See id. (noting the plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts of pregnancy
complications). To be clear, the case is not a model of pleading by the plaintiff because
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short-term impairment can be substantially limiting if sufficiently severe
but then rely on the fact that an impairment is short-term to establish it is
not severe enough to be substantially limiting.86 This reasoning is especially
likely if the court characterizes the impairment as a one-time occurrence.87
For example, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania required as a pleading
standard that the plaintiff allege an impairment that was more than a onetime occurrence.88 In that case, the plaintiff suffered from a double hernia
that occurred at work and underwent surgery that required a six week
medical leave of absence. 89 The court reasoned that his inability to work
did not support finding sufficient limitation because the hernia occurred only
once.90 Similarly, the Northern District of Texas concluded that an employee
who was fired for safety concerns related to an episode of dehydration and
possible heat stroke failed to show that the episode was substantially limiting
because, even though his doctor required several follow up medical
appointments, the episode only occurred once and lasted only a few hours.91
If courts do not frame the rule as requiring more than a one-time
occurrence, they may instead suggest that the plaintiff establishes some
kind of medical complication or long-term consequence from the impairment.
For example, the Western District of Arkansas reasoned that “typically,
broken limbs will not constitute disabilities under the ADA. It is only the
unique circumstances of [the plaintiff’s] injury—that it required corrective
surgery, impairing her ability to work for a full year—that render it a
disability under the Act.”92 Even with the year-long restrictions, the court
she did not outright state whether she had a miscarriage. Nonetheless, the court’s reasoning
indicates that the short duration of a miscarriage would disqualify it from ADA coverage.
See id.
86. See, e.g., Mastrio v. Eurest Servs., Inc., No. 3:13-CV-00564, 2014 WL 840229,
at *5 (D. Conn. Mar. 4, 2014) (finding that even though the plaintiff had a physical
impairment that substantially limited his ability to work and walk, the court nonetheless
concluded that he failed to state a claim because of the short-term nature of the impairment).
87. See, e.g., Willis v. Noble Env’t Power, LLC, 143 F. Supp. 3d 475, 477, 482–83
(N.D. Tex. 2015). In Willis, the court correctly noted that duration was only one factor in
the analysis, but then proceeded to distinguish other cases on the basis that they were not
one-time occurrences. See id. at 483.
88. Butler v. BTC Foods Inc., Civil Action No. 12-492, 2012 WL 5315034, at *3
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 2012). The court supported this assertion by citing the episodic rule of
construction. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D)).
89. Id. at *1.
90. See id. at *3.
91. Willis, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 477, 482; see also Clay v. Campbell Cnty. Sheriff’s
Off., No. 6:12-CV-00062, 2013 WL 3245153, at * 2–3 (W.D. Va. June 26, 2013) (rejecting
plaintiff’s disability claim based on an episode of kidney stones because court found it “a
temporary, one-time issue that was resolved within two weeks”).
92. Orr v. City of Rogers, 232 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1065 (W.D. Ark. 2017) (“Orr
originally broke her arm in February of 2013. Because the break did not heal correctly, her
doctor recommended corrective surgery in September of that year, and she did not fully
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called it a “a borderline case, just barely falling within the ADA’ s
protections.”93 The court gave no rationale for why it was a close case
other than citing to “the weight of the post-ADAAA case law” finding
similar injuries not to be disabilities.94 In a Title II and Rehabilitation Act
case involving an inmate who sustained a foot injury, which limited his
mobility for six months and required him to at one point use crutches, the
Northern District of Illinois acknowledged that the amended ADA does
not categorically exclude temporary impairments.95 However, the court
again looked to the duration of the impairment and reasoned that “[o]rdinarily,
temporary injuries that neither cause nor relate to longer-term impairments
generally do not demonstrate a disability under the ADA . . . .”96 The court
found the inmate failed to show “evidence of any lasting consequence past
that [six month] period.”97
By contrast, some courts have found that fairly short-term impairments
can be substantially limiting of major life activities under the ADAAA’s
expanded definition.98 Some decisions note the Interpretive Guidance
refers in a fairly non-specific way to a lifting restriction “that lasts for several
months.”99 For example, the Western District of Michigan relied on that
sample restriction to deny an employer’s summary judgment motion when
the plaintiff’s torn bicep resulted in approximately four months of work-

recover until the early part of 2014. Thus, Orr’s impairment lasted for approximately a
year.”).
93. Id. at 1065 n.6.
94. See id. at 1065.
95. Shaw v. Williams, No. 16-CV-1065, 2018 WL 3740665, at *8–9 (N.D. Ill. Aug.
7, 2018).
96. Id. at *9.
97. Id. The court acknowledged that short-term impairments could be substantially
limiting; however, the court concluded that duration plays a role in this analysis and that
short-term impairments are not covered unless sufficiently severe. Id.
98. See Esparza v. Pierre Foods, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1106 (S.D. Ohio 2013)
(finding the plaintiff plausibly alleged an ADA disability based on his kidney stones that
required a two week recuperation period); see also Burnell v. Tealwood Care Ctrs., Inc.,
No. 16-3001, 2018 WL 4293150, at *7 (D. Minn. July 10, 2018) (finding the plaintiff had
created a material issue of fact regarding whether she had a disability due to a fractured
leg because a broken bone can substantially impair “walking, standing, or working, for a
period of a few months”).
99. See Burnell, 2018 WL 4293150, at *8 (citing 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix)
(2018)); Judge v. Landscape Forms, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-1117, 2014 WL 12502685, at *5
(W.D. Mich. Mar. 6, 2014) (citing 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) (2013)); cf. Summers
v. Altarum Inst., Corp., 740 F.3d 325, 329 (4th Cir. 2014) (finding impairments that lasted
about seven months were sufficient to allege an ADA disability claim).
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related restrictions.100 Other courts have denied motions to dismiss because
they focused on the effects of the impairments and not on their duration.101
The Southern District of Florida concluded that a plaintiff had plausibly
stated a claim when she alleged her sprained ankle limited her ability to
walk and stand “for long periods of time.”102 The Northern District of
California found it was sufficient to deny defendant’s motion to dismiss
for the plaintiff to allege her knee impairment required her to use crutches
or otherwise walk with difficulty.103
Not all courts have taken a broader view of short-term impairments on
motions to dismiss.104 Equating severity with duration, the District of
Connecticut found a complaint insufficient on its face even while acknowledging
that the impairment was substantial while it was active.105 The Western
District of North Carolina characterized a complaint as merely conclusory
because it did not include specific facts about the duration of the
impairment.106
For other courts, the difference between a motion to dismiss as compared
to summary judgment changed their conclusion about whether the plaintiff
was able to show sufficient limitation from a short-term impairment.107 The

100. See Judge, 2014 WL 12502685, at *1–2, *5.
101. See Nails v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., No. 17-62172-CIV-COOKE, 2018 WL
1863623, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 15, 2018) (finding the plaintiff plausibly alleged that she
had a disability by stating that her sprained ankle substantially limited her ability to walk).
102. Id. Nails stands in contrast to a summary judgment case in which the court
found similar non-detailed allegations insufficient. See Weems v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist.,
260 F. Supp. 3d 719, 728 (N.D. Tex. 2017) (reasoning that the note from plaintiff’s doctor
failed to contain sufficient specifics about how long he could stand and how far he could
walk).
103. See Barrilleaux v. Mendocino County, 61 F. Supp. 3d 906, 916 (N.D. Cal. 2014)
(“Although further discovery may reveal that Plaintiff is not a qualified disabled person,
she has stated a claim for relief because she has alleged that she required crutches to walk
or otherwise walks with difficulties due to a weakened knee, which reflects a substantial
impairment in the major life activity of walking.”).
104. See, e.g., Koller v. Riley Riper Hollin & Colagreco, 850 F. Supp. 2d 502, 513–
14 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (acknowledging that the plaintiff’s burden is much higher on a motion
for summary judgment than on a motion to dismiss but nonetheless finding that the plaintiff
failed to plead “important” limitations on a major life activity).
105. See Mastrio v. Eurest Servs., Inc., No. 3:13-CV-00564, at *4 (D. Conn. Mar. 4,
2014) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss a disability claim despite finding the plaintiff’s
limitations due to kidney stones were substantial during the month he suffered them).
106. See Pope v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., No. 3:17-CV-564, 2018 WL 3551528, at
*4 (W.D.N.C. July 24, 2018) (granting the motion to dismiss the ADA claim because the
plaintiff alleged only that he injured his back, with no additional specifics about the injury
or duration of his limitations, and his doctor required him to be placed on light duty as a
result).
107. Compare Feldman v. Law Enf’t Assocs. Corp., 779 F. Supp. 2d 472, 485 (E.D.N.C.
2011) (denying motion to dismiss), with Feldman v. Law Enf’t Assocs. Corp., 955 F. Supp.
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Eastern District Court of North Carolina initially found on a motion to
dismiss that the plaintiff had stated a claim because the impairment he
alleged, a transient ischemic attack—TIA—while short, nonetheless had
significant effects while it was occurring.108 That same court, however,
later granted the employer’s summary judgment motion, finding the
plaintiff only alleged a “‘mild TIA’ that had ‘since resolved.’”109 Absent
evidence that the TIA was likely to recur or other evidence it impaired his
ability to work—the major life activity the plaintiff alleged—the court
found the plaintiff failed to create a genuine issue of material fact that he
had a disability.110
It is not surprising courts have a confusing track record applying a
statute that sets up an incoherent scheme. The ADA requires a finding of
substantial limitation, but severity is too demanding—except for shortterm impairments where severity is specifically required but defined only
by example. Rules excluding one-time occurrences or setting a six-month

2d 528, 547 (E.D.N.C. 2013), aff’d on other grounds, 752 F.3d 339 (4th Cir. 2014) (granting
the defendant summary judgment).
108. See Feldman, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 485. The court described the nature of a TIA
as “a blood clot temporarily clogs an artery, and part of the brain does not get the blood it
needs,” and noted the plaintiff alleged “that while he suffered the effects of the TIA, he
was substantially limited in his ability to perform ‘multiple major life activities.’” Id. The
court then moved to its conclusion:
As a result, the court finds that a TIA is not comparable to a common cold, a
sprained joint, or any of the other examples listed in the proposed EEOC regulations.
Thus, at this early stage of the proceedings, the court is unwilling to say that
Feldman has failed to sufficiently allege that he had a disability.
Id. It should be noted that the proposed regulation the court referenced, which would have
singled out those particular short-term impairments as not substantially limiting major life
activities, was not included in the final regulation or interpretive guidance. See supra notes
67–69 and accompanying text.
109. Feldman, 955 F. Supp. 2d at 538.
110. Id. at 539. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged only the major life activity of
working. Id. The “major bodily function” part of the expanded definition seemingly offered a
stronger alternative pathway to find substantial limitations. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B)
(defining major life activities to include the operation of “major bodily function[s]” such
as “neurological [systems and the] brain”). Had the plaintiff alleged a limitation of such
bodily functions, the court should then have more clearly focused on the effects of the TIA
while it was occurring and given more weight to the connection between TIAs, strokes,
and other serious conditions. See Michael D. Hill & Shelagh B. Coutts, Preventing Stroke
after Transient Ischemic Attack, 183 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 1127, 1127–28 (2011) (“Among
patients with transient ischemic attack, one in five will have a subsequent stroke (the most
common outcome), a heart attack or die within one year.”).
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minimum allow courts to continue to apply their preexisting notions about
the type of impairments deserving of anti-discrimination protections.
B. Continuing to Cite Pre-ADAAA Precedent
Duration has been a sticky variable in large part because courts continue
to cite pre-ADAAA case law and the EEOC guidance that shorter term
impairments are not substantial.111 Some recent decisions cite the EEOC’s
pre-ADAAA substantial limitation definition, which asks whether someone
is unable to perform a major life activity or is otherwise significantly
restricted in doing so,112 despite the fact that Congress explicitly rejected
it in the ADAAA’s findings and purposes.113 The Northern District of
Mississippi even acknowledged that the ADAAA does not preclude finding
temporary impairments to be substantially limiting but then repeatedly
cited to pre-ADAAA regulations and interpretive guidance indicating temporary
impairments such as “broken limbs, sprained joints, concussions,
appendicitis, and influenza” are not covered.114 As noted above, neither

111. See, e.g., Kruger v. Hamilton Manor Nursing Home, 10 F. Supp. 3d 385, 389
(W.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing pre-ADAAA case law); Swann v. US Foods, Inc., No. 1:14-CV01409, 2015 WL 3793739, at *4 (E.D. Va. June 17, 2015) (citing a string of pre-2009
ADA cases and reasoning that courts find impairments insubstantial if they “only
moderately” affect a person’s ability to walk); Martinez v. N.Y. State Div. of Hum. Rts.,
No. 1:13-CV-1252-GHW, 2015 WL 437399, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2015) (citing both
pre- and post-ADAAA cases for the proposition that an impairment of limited duration
with no long-term effects is not substantially limiting). Swann similarly applied
pre-ADAAA requirements to the plaintiff’s claim that he was regarded as having a
disability. See Swann, 2015 WL 3793739, at *5 (asserting that the employer not only must
have known about the plaintiff’s impairment but consequently must have regarded the
plaintiff as having a substantial limitation in his ability to work).
112. See, e.g., Clark v. Boyd Tunica, Inc., No. 3:14-CV-00204-MPM-JMV, 2016
WL 853529, at *3 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 1, 2016) (citing two different cases for its reliance on
the pre-ADAAA version of 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ii)), aff’d, 665 F. App’x 367 (5th Cir.
2016). Section 1630.2(j)(ii) previously set out three factors for substantial limitation:
(1) unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general
population can perform; or (2) significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or
duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity
as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person
in the general population can perform that same major life activity.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ii) (2008).
113. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-325, § 2(b)(6), 122 Stat. 3553.
114. See Clark, 2016 WL 853529, at *4. Clark quoted the superseded version of 29
C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j) that stated “temporary, non-chronic impairments of short duration,
with little or no long-term or permanent impact, are usually not disabilities.” Id. (misattributing
the quoted language to the regulation rather than the Interpretive Guidance). The court
also quoted language from the prior version of the EEOC’s Interpretive Guidance that
“broken limbs, sprained joints, concussions, appendicitis, and influenza” are non-disabling
impairments. See id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j) (2015)); see also Shaw v. Williams,
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the current regulation nor its interpretive guidance include a similar list of
ordinarily excluded conditions.115 Similarly, the Northern District of Texas
granted an employer summary judgment because it found the plaintiff’s
doctor did not state that the plaintiff would have “considerable difficulty”
or be “unable” to perform any major life activity.116 Both of those are preADAAA standards.117
Perhaps the most extreme example is how courts continue to cite the
Supreme Court’s decision in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, v.
Williams.118 The Court held in Toyota that the definition of disability was
to be strictly construed and required permanent or long-term impairments.119
The ADAAA’s findings and purposes could not have been clearer that
Congress rejected those standards.120 Nonetheless, courts cite Toyota’s
reasoning in their post-ADAAA decisions finding the plaintiff failed to
show a substantially limiting impairment.121
No. 16-CV-1065, 2018 WL 3740665, at *8–9 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2018) (citing Clark and
the same superseded list of “temporary, non-disabling impairments”).
115. See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text.
116. Weems v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 260 F. Supp. 3d 719, 728 (N.D. Tex. 2017).
The doctor’s note in Weems set out workplace restrictions on the plaintiff’s activities
including no walking for long distances, no climbing, and no standing for long amounts
of time. Id. at 724. The court insisted the doctor’s note was insufficient to establish
substantial limitation because the plaintiff did not provide specific details about “what
constitutes ‘walking for long distances’ or ‘standing for long amounts of time.’ Moreover,
[the plaintiff] never stated how far he had to walk or how long he had to stand while [he
performed his work].” Id. at 729. The court gave lip service to the broader post-ADAAA
standard, but still concluded that the record was too scant to support the plaintiff’s disability
claim. See id.
117. ADAAA Interpretive Guidance specifically rejects “considerable” as compatible
with the ADAAA’s rules of construction. Regulations To Implement the Equal Employment
Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,977, 16,981 (Mar. 25,
2011). The Interpretive Guidance further rejects pre-ADAAA reasoning that required
individuals to show that they were “unable” to perform a major life activity. 29 C.F.R.
app. § 1630.2(j)(1)(vii) (2020) (interpreting the rule of construction for episodic impairments).
118. Toyota Moto Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002), superseded by
statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
119. Id. at 198–99.
120. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a)(7), 122 Stat. 3553
(2008) (“The Supreme Court, in [Toyota], interpreted the term ‘substantially limits’ to
require a greater degree of limitation than was intended by Congress . . . .”).
121. See, e.g., Zurenda v. Cardiology Assocs., P.C., No. 3:10-CV-0882, 2012 WL
1801740, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. May 16, 2012) (citing Toyota for the standard to prove substantial
limitation); see also Neumann v. Plastipak Packaging, Inc., No. 1:11-CV-522, 2011 WL
5360705, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2011) (citing pre-ADAAA caselaw that relied on
Toyota for the rule that impairments must be permanent or long-term to be substantially
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In a number of cases, courts provide no depth of analysis beyond citing
to pre-ADAAA decisions and post-ADAAA cases reflecting similar
reasoning. 122 For example, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania reasoned
that “[a] temporary non-chronic impairment of short duration is not a
disability covered under the ADA,” citing in part to authority relying on
pre-ADAAA case law.123 In an extensive string cite that blended pre- and
post-ADAAA cases, the District of Connecticut concluded courts “have
still adhered to the traditional notion that temporary or short-term disabilities
are not covered by the statute absent allegations highlighting the extreme
severity of the disability.”124
To consider whether a short-term impairment is “sufficiently severe”
courts have also treated the EEOC’s guidance as an invitation to revert to
stringent pre-ADAAA standards.125 As noted above, the District of Connecticut
ramped up the standard by requiring plaintiffs to show “extreme severity.”126
That court rejected the plaintiff’s claim that his kidney stones, which
resulted in multiple hospitalizations and surgeries, were severe enough
because he failed to show any continuing effects.127 This was despite the
fact that earlier in the opinion, the court acknowledged that during the
month the kidney stones were active, “[t]here [was] no doubt . . . the Plaintiff
demonstrated ‘a physical or mental impairment that substantially limit[ed]
one or more major life activities’ because he could not go to work or even
walk around.”128

limiting). But see Cohen v. CHLN, Inc., No. 10-00514, 2011 WL 2713737, at * 6–8 (E.D.
Pa. July 13, 2011) (reasoning that Congress rejected Toyota and adopted a less restrictive
standard with no strict duration requirement and, under that standard, a jury could find
debilitating back and leg pain that lasted nearly four months to be a disability).
122. See, e.g., Zick v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, No. 11 Civ. 5093(CM),
2012 WL 4785703, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2012) (citing pre-ADAAA case law to
conclude that the plaintiff’s broken leg was not considered a disability under the ADA);
Neumann, 2011 WL 5360705, at *9 (citing pre-ADAAA caselaw for the requirement that
impairments must be permanent or long-term).
123. Poper v. SCA Ams., Inc., No. 10-3201, 2012 WL 3288111, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
13, 2012) (citing Macfarlan v. Ivy Hill SNF, LLC, 675 F.3d 266, 274 (3d Cir. 2012)
(addressing facts arising prior to the effective date of the ADAAA)).
124. Mastrio v. Eurest Servs., Inc., No. 3:13-CV-00564(VLB), 2014 WL 840229, at
*4 (D. Conn. Mar. 4, 2014).
125. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) (2020).
126. See Mastrio, 2014 WL 840229, at *4. Among the cases Mastrio cites is Palmieri v.
City of Hartford, which itself cites a pre-ADAAA Second Circuit decision for the
proposition that the “[c]ircuit has explicitly deferred consideration of whether a temporary
impairment is per se unprotected under the ADA.” Palmieri v. City of Hartford, 947 F.
Supp. 2d 187, 198–99 (D. Conn. 2013) (citing Adams v. Citizens Advice Bureau, 187 F.3d
315, 317 (2d Cir. 1999)).
127. Mastrio, 2014 WL 840229, at *5–6.
128. See id.
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To date, only the Fourth Circuit has directly addressed how the ADAAA
covers short-term impairments, and although that case involved an impairment
that lasted longer than six months it avoided most of the pitfalls discussed
above.129 The Fourth Circuit criticized the lower court for relying on preADAAA decisions and emphasized Congress’s mandate to construe the
ADA as broadly as its text permits.130 As such, “it seem[ed] clear” to the
court that the plaintiff’s serious leg injuries, although ostensibly treated
by surgery and seven months of recovery time, were serious enough to be
considered an actual disability under the EEOC’s interpretive guidance on
short-term impairments.131 Although the court referenced the duration of
the plaintiff’s recovery, it equally emphasized the degree of impairment
the plaintiff experienced.132 Comparing the plaintiff’s facts to the back
impairment example in the Interpretive Guidance, the court reasoned “surely
a person whose broken legs and injured tendons render him completely
immobile for more than seven months is also disabled.”133
Despite that guidance, at least one subsequent case acknowledged the
Fourth Circuit’s reasoning but then again emphasized the importance of
duration, citing a confused mash-up of the current and outdated Interpretive
Guidance, including the superseded guidance listing types of impairments
not considered disabilities. 134 The case in many ways encapsulates the

129. See Summers v. Altarum Inst., Corp., 740 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2014) (noting
that the Fourth Circuit was the first federal circuit to apply ADAAA’s expanded definition
of disability); see also Levy, supra note 66, at 555 (“The Fourth Circuit’s opinion in
[Summers] was the first circuit court decision to give the ADAAA strong effect as applied
to temporary impairments . . . .”).
130. See Summers, 740 F.3d at 329–30.
131. Id. at 330.
132. See id. at 329–30.
133. Id. at 330.
134. See Shaw v. Williams, No. 16-CV-1065, 2018 WL 3740665, at *8 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 8, 2018) (citing Summers, 740 F.3d at 333). The court first correctly references the
“sufficiently severe” standard in the current Interpretive Guidance. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R.
app. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) (2018)). However, the court then quotes the list of temporary, nondisabling impairments listed only in the pre-ADAAA Interpretive Guidance. See id.
(attributing to the current Title I Interpretive Guidance language from the 1991 regulations
which lists “broken limbs, sprained joints, concussions, and influenza” as examples
of temporary impairments that are not covered by the ADA (quoting 29 C.F.R. app. §
1630.2(j)(1)(ix) (2018)); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (2020) (defining substantial limitation
to exclude temporary, non-chronic conditions); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) (2020)
(making clear that impairments that last less than six months can be substantially limiting,
without listing impairments that are generally not covered).
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stickiness of pre-ADAAA law and the resulting judicial confusion about
the proper sources for interpreting post-ADAAA cases.
C. Failing to Recognize the Significance of the Episodic and Mitigating
Measures Rules of Construction
Two of the ADAAA’s new rules of construction should have lead courts
away from their emphasis on duration but they have not been particularly
fruitful for plaintiffs alleging short-term impairments.135 The ADAAA
provides that impairments that are episodic or in remission can be disabilities
if they are substantially limiting in their active state.136 In addition, impairments
that can be mitigated by taking medication, using assistive technology, or
engaging in learned behavioral modifications, among other things, should
be evaluated without taking these mitigating measures into account.137 A
few courts have cited to these rules in support of their decision to allow
short-term impairment cases to proceed.138 In other cases, however, courts
have concluded the rule does not apply to short-term impairments.139
The Eastern District of North Carolina rejected applying the episodic
rule to the plaintiff’s claim that he was discriminated against after he
suffered a transient ischemic attack, TIA, otherwise known as a ministroke.140 TIAs are caused by blood clots that briefly block blood flow to

135. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D) (clarifying the coverage of impairments that are episodic
or in remission); id. § 12102(4)(E)(i) (excluding consideration of mitigating measures).
136. Id. § 12102(4)(D); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(vii) (2020). The episodic
rule was added to protect individuals with impairments that are episodic or in remission
because such impairments will continue to substantially limit their major life activities.
See H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 2, at 19 (2008).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(ii) (providing that ordinary eyeglasses are a limited
exception from the prohibition on considering mitigating measures).
138. See Summers v. Altarum Inst., Corp., 740 F.3d 325, 330 n.3 (4th Cir. 2014)
(noting that the EEOC rejected a proposed regulation which implemented the mitigating
measures rule of construction which would have allowed courts to reject claims if surgical
intervention permanently eliminated the plaintiff’s impairment); Esparza v. Pierre Foods,
923 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1106 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (citing the rule on episodic and in-remission
impairments to find that the plaintiff’s kidney stones “appear[ed] to meet this minimal
threshold”).
139. See Feldman v. Law Enf’t Assocs. Corp., 955 F. Supp. 2d 528, 538 (E.D.N.C.
2013) (declining to apply the episodic rule to a short-term impairment), aff’d on other
grounds, 752 F.3d 339 (4th Cir. 2014); Clark v. Boyd Tunica, Inc., 3:14-CV-00204-MPMJMV, 2016 WL 853529, at *5 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 1, 2016) (suggesting that episodic conditions
tend to be recurring conditions). But see Esparza, 923 F. Supp. 2d at 1106 (denying the
defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim that his kidney stones were a disability
because the complaint met the minimal threshold to assert an impairment that is episodic
or in remission).
140. Feldman, 955 F. Supp. 2d at 538.
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the brain.141 While the TIA itself typically resolves after a few minutes, a
significant number of people who experience a TIA go on to have a stroke
or other serious health conditions including death.142 The court acknowledged
the significant risk that a person who suffers a TIA would eventually
suffer a stroke, but nonetheless concluded that the episodic rule did not
apply because a TIA “is an acute condition that is different from . . . more
chronic conditions—such as cancer, epilepsy, multiple sclerosis . . . .”143
Moreover, the court suggested that even if the TIA was an impairment
that is episodic or in remission, the plaintiff failed to prove substantial
limitation because he offered no evidence that his activities were restricted
beyond an overnight hospital visit.144
As that case illustrates, the episodic rule is problematic because it can
be read to presuppose a continuing condition—one that comes and goes
and could come again, such as the seizures experienced with epilepsy.145
Even when plaintiffs do not clearly raise the episodic rule in support of
their argument the court may use it against them as support for requiring
the impairment “be of a reoccurring or on-going nature.”146
141. What Is a TIA?, AM. STROKE ASS’N (Dec. 28, 2018), https://www.stroke.org/
en/about-stroke/types-of-stroke/tia-transient-ischemic-attack/what-is-a-tia [https://perma.cc/
H4CL-7MQU].
142. See, e.g., Hill & Coutts, supra note 110, at 1127–28 (“Among patients with
transient ischemic attack, one in five will have a subsequent stroke (the most common
outcome), a heart attack or die within one year.”). In 2009, A medical expert panel
recommended to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration “that all individuals who
have experienced a single TIA be immediately excluded from driving a [commercial motor
vehicle]” and that they remain “free from recurrent TIA or stroke for a period of at least
one year” in order to be considered qualified thereafter. ABIODUN AKINWUNTAN, PHILIP
GORELICK & MEHEROZ RABADI, EXPERT PANEL RECOMMENDATIONS: STROKE AND COMMERCIAL
MOTOR VEHICLE DRIVER SAFETY 8 (2009).
143. Feldman, 955 F. Supp. 2d at 538.
144. Id. at 538–39. This case may have been affected by the plaintiff’s choice to
allege that the TIA substantially limited his ability to work, rather than argue that, while
active, the TIA substantially limited his cardiovascular and neurological systems under the
new major bodily function section in the definition of major life activities. See id. at 539
n.4 (noting that the plaintiff had only alleged working as a major life activity in his amended
complaint); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D).
145. The legislative history used epilepsy as the example to demonstrate what Congress
intended the episodic rule to address. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 2, at 19 (2008)
(indicating that a person with epilepsy who experiences loss of control over major life
activities during a seizure would be covered under the episodic rule “even if those seizures
occur daily, weekly, monthly, or rarely”).
146. Clark v. Boyd Tunica, Inc., 3:14-CV-00204-MPM-JMV, 2016 WL 853529, at
*5 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 1, 2016) (citing Carmona v. Sw. Airlines Co., 604 F.3d 848, 855 (5th
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Similar reasoning is found in cases analyzing the new mitigating measures
rule.147 The new rule was specifically intended to increase the summary
judgment survival of claims involving impairments which are often effectively
treated by medication, such as epilepsy and diabetes.148 In some shortterm impairment cases plaintiffs have invoked the new mitigating measures
rule in support of their argument that their impairment is covered despite
its short duration.149 For example, one plaintiff argued that the court should
consider the staph infection and corneal infiltration in his eye without
taking into account the antibiotics and creams he was prescribed to treat
it.150 His ophthalmologist gave him a thirty percent chance of losing the
eye.151 The court disagreed with the plaintiff’s argument, however, reasoning
the “provision [on mitigating measures] applies to efforts to mitigate the
symptoms of an impairment, not treatment that resolves a condition in its
entirety.”152 The court cited the Merriam-Webster Dictionary definition
of “‘mitigate’ as ‘to cause to become less harsh or hostile; to make less
severe or painful.’”153 In a different case, the same judge had elaborated
his concern that if the court were required to evaluate something like an
H1N1 virus infection in its untreated condition, that would mean “almost
any infection or injury, regardless of its actual impact, be treated as a
covered disability [because] virtually any minor injury could lead to longterm disability or death if not properly treated.”154 By setting up such an
extreme strawman, it was easy for the court to knock it down.155
Cir. 2010)) (addressing that the ADAAA made it easier to establish coverage for episodic
conditions), aff’d, 665 F. App’x 367 (5th Cir. 2016).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(ii) (providing a limited exception for ordinary eyeglasses
from the prohibition on considering mitigating measures).
148. H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 2, at 20–21 (2008).
149. See, e.g., Leone v. All. Foods, Inc., No. 8:14-CV-800-T-27TBM, 2015 WL
4879406, at *2, *7 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 14, 2015); McKenzie-Nevolas v. Deaconess Holdings,
LLC, No. CIV-12-570-D, 2014 WL 518086, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 7, 2014); Lewis v.
Fla. Default L. Grp., P.L., No. 8:10-CV-1182-T-27EAJ, 2011 WL 4527456, at *5 (M.D.
Fla. Sept. 16, 2011).
150. Leone, 2015 WL 4879406, at *7. While the court acknowledged the ADAAA’s
admonition to construe the statute in favor of broad coverage, it was more persuaded by
the regulation’s suggestion that short-term impairments are typically not covered. Id.
151. Id. at *2.
152. Id.
153. Id. at *7 n.9.
154. Lewis v. Fla. Default L. Grp., P.L., No. 8:10-CV-1182-T-27EAJ, 2011 WL 4527456,
at *5 & n.19 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 16, 2011).
155. Lewis suggested that failure to treat a wound may lead to a serious life-threatening
infection and failure to properly treat a broken bone can result in permanent disfigurement.
Id. But it is difficult to see how those examples can be distinguished from any other mitigating
measure case, where the impairment’s active status matters, not how the individual is able
to ameliorate it with treatment. Of significance, although the original ADA legislative
reports suggested that the Act would not cover a “simple infected finger,” the ADA
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Instead, more relevant is that both the statute and regulations list “medication,
medical supplies, [and] equipment” as potential mitigating measures without
delineating the effect of those measures. 156 The regulations similarly
specifically delineate “[p]sychotherapy, behavioral therapy, or physical
therapy” as mitigating measures, any of which could resolve the impairment
for which the individual seeks treatment.157 Further, the legislative reports
reference “surgical interventions,” which clearly have the potential to cure
an impairment.158 The language in the House Reports is unequivocal that
Congress expected that mitigating measures—other than ordinary eye
glasses—would not be considered to determine substantial limitation.159
The better read of congressional intent puts the mitigating measures
provision in context with the episodic impairment provision and recognizes
that impairments that significantly limit function when they are active,
even if short-term and resolved by treatment, are nonetheless substantially
limiting. With this understanding, a minor sprain that does not significantly
legislative history references this example only in the Additional Views to the House of
Representative Report, which expresses the minority’s concern that the amended statute is
not read to allow coverage of impairments that are not permanent and long-term. H.R.
REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 2, at 30 (2008) (first citing S. REP. NO. 101-116, pt. 1, at 23 (1989);
and then citing H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990)).
156. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i)(I); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(5)(i) (2020).
157. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(5)(v). The ADAAA’s text does not spell out those
measures but it does more generally include “learned behavioral or adaptive neurological
modifications.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i)(IV). Both the Fourth and Ninth Circuits have
concluded that “learned behavioral modifications,” such as following a strict diet to control
celiac disease or diabetes, are mitigating measures that the court cannot take into account,
even if they completely control the plaintiff’s symptoms. See J.D. v. Colonial Williamsburg
Found., 925 F.3d 663, 670 (4th Cir. 2019) (addressing celiac disease); Rohr v. Salt River
Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 555 F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 2009) (addressing
diabetes).
158. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at 15 (2008) (stating that surgical interventions
should not be considered “in determining whether an impairment is substantially limiting”).
The EEOC initially proposed as an example mitigating measure “surgical interventions,
except for those that permanently eliminate an impairment.” See generally Regulations of
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,978 (Mar. 25, 2011). It dropped this
proposal after the public comments indicated it was confusing, and instead suggested that
surgical interventions were more appropriately considered on a case-by-case basis. Id. at
16,979. At least one case, nonetheless, has suggested that treatments that alleviate a condition
in its entirety are not mitigating measures as referenced in the statute. Cf. McKenzieNevolas v. Deaconess Holdings LLC, No. CIV-12-570-D, 2014 WL 518086, at *2 (W.D.
Okla. Feb. 7, 2014).
159. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 2, at 20 (2008) (“Once the ameliorative effects
of a mitigating measure can no longer be considered in determining whether an impairment
is substantially limiting . . . .”).
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restrict the individual’s ability to walk and heals in a few days without
need for medical treatment would not substantially limit either the ability
to walk or a person’s musculoskeletal function. But a fractured ankle would
be substantially limiting because, until it is treated with surgery and a cast,
the fracture would substantially weaken a significant part of the musculoskeletal
system—a major bodily function—and make walking more difficult.160
The fact that the fracture healed without complication makes no significant
difference as to whether the impairment was substantially limiting when
it was active.
IV. HOW COURTS HAVE CONFUSED THE “REGARDED AS” PRONG’S
MINOR AND TRANSITORY IMPAIRMENTS EXCLUSION
As discussed in Part II above, unlike the “actual” prong in the ADA’s
definition of disability, the “regarded as” prong is explicitly hinged on
duration.161 The ADAAA excludes from the otherwise broad coverage of
this prong impairments that are “transitory and minor.”162 The statute
defines transitory as “an impairment with an actual or expected duration
of 6 months or less,” but does not define minor.163 The EEOC’s regulations
also do not define what is minor beyond providing it should be determined
by an objective standard.164 As this section demonstrates, the “transitory
and minor” defense has proven to be quite popular with defense counsel
and frequently succeeds despite it being a narrow exception to an otherwise
broad rule.165
The cases demonstrate several questionable interpretations of the revised
“regarded as” prong. First, as with actual disability claims, some courts
continue to apply pre-ADAAA standards by requiring proof of substantial
limitation of a major life activity.166 Second, some courts read “and” out
of the statute, dismissing claims solely because they find the impairment
to have lasted less than six months.167 This may change in light of a recent

160. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(ii) (defining “major bodily function” to include
operation of the musculoskeletal system); id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (defining substantial limitation
by comparing an individual’s ability to perform a major life activity to “most people in the
general population”).
161. See supra notes 70–81 and accompanying text.
162. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B).
163. Id.; see also Silk v. Bd. of Trs., Moraine Valley Cmty. Coll., 795 F.3d 698, 706
(7th Cir. 2015) (noting that the statute does not define minor).
164. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(f) (2020).
165. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(l) (2020) (indicating that the “transitory and minor”
exception is to be constructed narrowly).
166. See infra Part IV.A.
167. See infra Part IV.B.
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Third Circuit opinion168 but that is not yet clear. Third, courts struggle to
apply the objective standard for “minor,” especially when the employer
took adverse action based on an actual albeit short-term impairment that
the employer considered to be substantial.169 Fourth, the EEOC regulations
indicate transitory and minor is an affirmative defense but not all courts
agree.170 Finally, there is the special case of employers who perceive the
employee may develop a disorder or condition, such as when the employee
is believed to have been exposed to an infectious disease but is not showing
any symptoms.171 Courts parse the language of the statute to require a
present impairment, or perception of a present impairment, which results
in these cases falling entirely outside the scope of the ADA.172
A. Continuing to Apply the pre-ADAAA Requirement that the
Employer Perceive an Impairment that Substantially
Limits a Major Life Activity
The amended ADA makes it straightforward that the plaintiff need only
establish that the employer regarded her as having an impairment. 173
Whether that impairment substantially limits a major life activity is no
longer relevant.174 Despite this clear change in the statute, some courts
continue to apply the pre-ADA standard. In some cases, they do so without
acknowledging the ADAAA, simply citing the substantial limitation standard
as articulated in pre-ADAAA case law.175 More commonly, courts mix
ADA and ADAAA standards, typically citing old authority that requires
168. See generally Eshleman v. Patrick Indus., Inc., 961 F.3d 242 (3d Cir. 2020)
(holding that the district court was obligated to evaluate both whether the impairment was
transitory and whether it was minor).
169. See infra Part IV.C.
170. See infra Part IV.D.
171. See Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. STME, LLC, 938 F.3d 1305, 1310
(11th Cir. 2019) (evaluating situation where an employer fired an employee out of fear
that she was exposed to the Ebola virus while on a trip to Ghana).
172. See infra Part IV.E.
173. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A).
174. See id.
175. See, e.g., Swann v. US Foods, Inc., No. 1:14-CV-01409, 2015 WL 3793739, at
* 4 (E.D. Va. June 17, 2015) (quoting pre-ADAAA case law for the proposition that the
defendant must mistakenly believe that the alleged impairment substantially limits a major
life activity); Chi. Reg’l Council of Carpenters v. Berglund Constr. Co., No. 12 C 3604,
2012 WL 3023422, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 24, 2012) (finding that the plaintiff failed to state
either an actual or “regarded as” claim because the evidence did not show that he was
substantially limited in the major life activity of lifting).
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the plaintiff to show substantial limitation and the new “transitory and
minor” rule.176 Blending of old and new law can be head-spinning:
A plaintiff is “regarded as” disabled if he is “subjected to a prohibited action
because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment, whether or not
that impairment substantially limits, or is perceived to substantial limit, a major life
activity.” To establish disability through this avenue, “the plaintiff must demonstrate
that the employer believed that a wholly unimpaired plaintiff had an impairment
that substantially limited at least one major life activity or that the employer
believed an employee’s actual impairment to limit major life activities when
it in fact did not.”
To prove a “regarded as” claim, “it does not suffice for a plaintiff to merely
show that his employer perceived him to be impaired.” Rather, a plaintiff “must
also show that his employer perceived such impairment as substantially limiting
his ability to work.” To establish that Defendants believed Plaintiff to be substantially
limited in the life activity of working, Plaintiff must demonstrate that Defendants
“misinterpreted information about an employee’s limitations to conclude that the
employee is incapable of performing a wide range of jobs.”

176. See Wilson v. Graybar Elec. Co. Inc., No. 17-3701, 2019 WL 1229778, at *13–
14 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 2019). The Sixth Circuit, and several district courts within the
circuit, continued to commit this error until 2019, and the Sixth Circuit itself continued to
cite the same three-part test of a “regarded as” claim that required plaintiffs to show the
perceived impairment substantially limited a major life activity. See Ferrari v. Ford Motor
Co., 826 F.3d 885, 893 (6th Cir. 2016) (misstating the standard for regarded as claims but
correctly citing the revised regulation defining major life activities), aff’d, 826 F.3d 885
(6th Cir. 2016), abrogated by Babb v. Maryville Anesthesiologists P.C., 942 F.3d 308 (6th
Cir. 2019) (holding that “regarded as” plaintiffs need only establish that they were perceived to
have an impairment). Among the district courts, several decisions continued to cite
authority from older cases requiring plaintiffs to show substantial limitation, but then
pivoted to considering whether the impairment is transitory and minor under the ADAAA.
See White v. Interstate Distrib. Co., 438 F. App’x 415, 420 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting the
superseded version of 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C) that requires proof of substantial limitation
of a major life activity; however, the current version of 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B) requires
the transitory and minor exception); see also Bernau v. Architectural Stainless, Inc., No.
17-CV-10766, 2017 WL 2831518, at *3 (E.D. Mich. June 30, 2017) (reasoning that the
plaintiff must show her employer mistakenly believed she had an actual or merely perceived
physical or mental impairment that substantially limited a major life activity and that the
ADA excludes transitory and minor impairments); Sasser v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 219
F. Supp. 3d 701, 707 (M.D. Tenn. 2016); Neumann v. Plastipak Packaging, Inc., No. 1:11CV-522, 2011 WL 5360705, at *10–11 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2011) (holding the same).
The Sixth Circuit finally corrected itself by acknowledging that substantial limitation was
no longer required and “[t]o the extent [the court had] issued decisions in recent years
holding to the contrary—and, regrettably, [the court did]—that was error.” Babb, 942 F.3d
at 319. Babb’s acknowledgement may have corrected the “substantial limitation” issue,
but it has not kept Sixth Circuit district courts from still relying on outdated pre-ADAAA
standards. See Richardson v. Koch Foods of Ala., LLC, No. 2:16-CV-00828-SRW, 2019
WL 1434662, at *7 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 29, 2019) (correctly citing the current version of the
“regarded as” prong but mistakenly citing pre-ADAAA case law for the proposition that a
physical impairment corrected by medication is not covered by the ADA).
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A plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he was “regarded as” disabled if the
impairment is “‘transitory or minor, which means it has an actual or expected
duration of six months or less.”177

Even when a court purports to utilize the correct standard, its reasoning
may not shake off the old standards. One court concluded that although
the employer knew the plaintiff had undergone surgery, “had some limitations
physically,” and had asked the plaintiff what was wrong with his leg, this
“[did] not mean [the employer] regarded [the plaintiff] as being disabled.”178
But of course, the question is whether the employer regarded the plaintiff
as having an impairment, which that employer clearly did. Another element
creeping into courts’ reasoning is whether the plaintiff is able to work,
which does not bode well for plaintiffs.179 In some post-ADAAA regarded
as cases, courts emphasize how soon plaintiffs returned to work after an
injury or surgery in determining whether their impairment was transitory
and minor.180 A case from the Northern District of Mississippi illustrates
how courts tie the two together:

177. Wilson, 2019 WL 1229778, at *13–14 (first quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A);
then quoting Fagan v. Elwyn Inc., No. 17-393, 2017 WL 3456528, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
11, 2017); then quoting Siegfried v. Lehigh Valley, Dairies, Inc., No. 02-cv-2951, 2003
WL 23471747, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2003); then quoting id.; then quoting Rinehimer
v. Cemcolift, Inc., 292 F.3d 375, 381 (3d Cir. 2002); and then quoting Budhun v. Reading
Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 765 F.3d 245, 259 (3d Cir. 2014)). Tellingly, in the portion of Wilson
quoted in the text, the court quotes the Budhun decision as requiring an impairment not be
“transitory or minor,” when that case correctly cites the statutory language requiring both
“transitory and minor.” See Budhun, 765 F.3d at 259 (“The statute curtails an individual’s
ability to state a ‘regarded as’ claim if the impairment is ‘transitory and minor,’ which
means it has an ‘actual or expected duration of six months or less.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
12102(3)(B))). Contributing to the courts’ confusion is the habit of quoting statutory
language as if it is a rule set by a case, as reflected by Wilson’s citing Budhun for the transitory
and minor defense and excluding that case’s statutory citation . See Wilson, 2019 WL
1229778, at *14.
178. Weems v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 260 F. Supp. 3d 719, 730 (N.D. Tex. 2017).
179. Curtis D. Edmonds, Lowering the Threshold: How Far Has the Americans with
Disabilities Act Amendments Act Expanded Access to the Courts in Employment Litigation?,
26 J.L. & POL’Y 1, 34 (2018) (noting 71.6% of cases in which plaintiffs lose on summary
judgment involve the “risk factor” of whether the plaintiff was substantially limited in the
ability to work).
180. See Martinez v. N.Y. Div. of Hum. Rts., No. 1:13-CV-1252-GHW, 2015 WL
437399, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2015) (emphasizing that the plaintiff attended a job
interview one month after she sprained her back and was cleared to return to work within
two or three months).
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As stated above, Plaintiff was cleared to resume regular working duties approximately
five months after the accident. There is also no indication [the plaintiff] or her
doctors expected the injury to last more than six months, thereby qualifying the
injury . . . as a “transitory impairment with an actual or expected duration of six
months or less.”181

In a case from the Northern District of Ohio, the court similarly emphasized
the lack of evidence relating to the plaintiff’s ability to work.182 The
plaintiff alleged he had continuing pain from his back and leg injury, which
needed surgery, and that his employer knew and discharged him for that
reason.183 The court rejected the plaintiff’s claim, reasoning that his employer
had not reassigned him to a different job nor reduced his hours and, at the
time the plaintiff was fired, he was able to complete all his job duties
without any physical restriction.184
B. Ignoring the “And” in “Transitory and Minor”
One of the cases discussed in the previous subsection illustrates another
questionable judicial habit when interpreting the ADAAA, namely glossing
over any real analysis of whether an impairment may be considered minor
separate from its duration.185 The ADA excludes impairments if they are
both “transitory and minor.”186 Despite the presence of “and” in this provision,
some courts have looked only to the duration of the impairments.187 For
example, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the plaintiff’s “regarded as”
argument failed as a matter of law because there was no question that his

181. Clark v. Boyd Tunica, Inc., 3:14-CV-00204-MPM-JMV, 2016 WL 853529, at
*6 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 1, 2016), aff’d, 665 F. App’x 367 (5th Cir. 2016).
182. Neumann v. Plastipak Packaging, Inc., No. 1:11-CV-522, 2011 WL 5360705,
at *1, *10 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2011).
183. See id. at *9–10.
184. See id. at *10.
185. See Clark, 2016 WL 853529, at *6 (asserting that broken bones are generally
minor and transitory and that the plaintiff’s broken bone was expected to heal in less than
six months without evaluating whether the impairment was minor).
186. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B) (emphasis
added).
187. See, e.g., Lyons v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 2020)
(“Any impairment as a result of [the plaintiff’s] lap band surgery was objectively transitory
and minor by her own admission, because the actual or expected duration of any impairment
related to the lap band procedure was less than six months.”); Kruger v. Hamilton Manor
Nursing Home, 10 F. Supp. 3d 385, 390 (W.D.N.Y. 2014) (reasoning that “[a]s a result”
of the fact that the plaintiff’s activities were only temporarily impacted, her “temporary
impairment is not covered” under the “regarded as” prong); Butler v. Advance/Newhouse
P’ship, No. 6:11-CV-1958-ORL-28GJK, 2013 WL 1233002, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 26,
2013) (evaluating a “regarded as” claim based on plaintiff’s back injury as lasting only twelve
weeks with no separate analysis of whether it was objectively minor).
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impairments were transitory.188 The Eastern District of Michigan reasoned
that “[e]ven if the [plaintiff’s] opioid use constituted an impairment, plaintiff
could not have been regarded as being disabled based on the opioid use
under the ADA, because the impairment was transitory.”189
After issuing more than one opinion in which it appeared to interpret
the transitory and minor exception as based on duration alone,190 the Third
Circuit recently walked that back. 191 The court acknowledged that the
legislative history indicated the exception “was intended to weed out only
‘claims at the lowest end of the spectrum of severity,’ such as ‘common
ailments like the cold or flu . . . .’”192 As such, the exception should be construed
narrowly.193 The court articulated a series of factors the trial court should
have considered: “the symptoms and severity of the impairment, the type
of treatment required, the risk involved, and whether any kind of surgical
intervention is anticipated or necessary—as well as the nature and scope
of any post-operative care.”194 A district court applying this standard
subsequently found that a plaintiff stated a “regarded as” claim regarding
a stroke and seizure that required only three days of medical care, because

188. White v. Interstate Distrib. Co., 438 F. App’x 415, 420 (6th Cir. 2011).
189. Ferrari v. Ford Motor Co., 96 F. Supp. 3d 668, 675 (E.D. Mich. 2015), aff’d,
826 F.3d 885 (6th Cir. 2016), abrogated by Babb v. Maryville Anesthesiologists P.C., 942
F.3d 308 (6th Cir. 2019).
190. See Michalesko v. Borough, 658 F. App’x 105, 107 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Employees
cannot bring [“regarded as”] claim[s] when the alleged impairment is ‘transitory and
minor,’ defined by the ADA as ‘an impairment with an actual or expected duration of
6 [sic] months or less.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B))); Budhun v. Reading Hosp. &
Med. Ctr., 765 F.3d 245, 259 (3d Cir. 2014) (“The statute curtails an individual’s ability
to state a ‘regarded as’ claim if the impairment is ‘transitory and minor,’ which means it
has an ‘actual or expected duration of six months or less.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
12102(3)(B))). A defendant in a Third Circuit district court suggested that there was in
fact a presumption that an impairment lasting less than six months would be minor. See
Bush v. Donahoe, 964 F. Supp. 2d 401, 423 (W.D. Pa. 2013). The court avoided the issue
by deciding the alleged impairment was objectively minor. See id.
191. Eshleman v. Patrick Indus., Inc., 961 F.3d 242, 248 (3d Cir. 2020) (reasoning
that the ADA does not apply the six-month duration standard to determining what is minor
and that the employer must show the perceived impairment is objectively “both transitory
and minor”). The court rationalized its prior decision in Budhun as determining that the
perceived impairment was minor. See id. at 249 (finding it to be abundantly clear the employer
considered Budhun to have “a broken bone in her hand and nothing more” (quoting Budhun,
765 F.3d at 259)).
192. Id. at 248 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at 18 (2008)).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 249.
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the court emphasized a factual record needed to be developed regarding
whether the impairment was minor.195
It remains to be seen whether courts in other jurisdictions will follow
the Third Circuit’s lead. Courts tend to default back to the duration of the
impairment even in cases that purport to separately evaluate whether the
impairment was minor.196 The Southern District of New York concluded
the eight to ten week recovery period for the plaintiff’s broken leg “thus”
made their injury “transitory or minor.”197 The Northern District of Indiana
concluded that the plaintiff’s back impairment was only minor, even
though the plaintiff had experienced intense pain, because it was “an acute
injury” from which the plaintiff “ma[de] a swift and complete recovery.”198
C. Determining What Is an Objectively Minor Impairment
Under the EEOC regulations, only impairments that are objectively minor
are excluded under the “regarded as” prong.199 A decision out of the Western
District of Pennsylvania shows how some courts apply a barely disguised
substantial limitation analysis to determine this issue.200 That court held
that an ankle sprain which required the plaintiff to wear a walking boot
for just under six months was objectively minor because she could not
demonstrate how it impaired her ability to work or any other activity of
daily living.201 Without explicitly invoking the substantial limitation standard,
the court nonetheless employed its reasoning:
[A]pplying an objective standard, the Court finds the evidence of record
overwhelmingly supports the conclusion [the plaintiff’s] impairment was also
minor . . . . [S]he could perform all the duties of her job description wearing a
walking cast, and there is no evidence that her orthopedic physician ever removed
her from her full duty. . . . In addition, there is no evidence that any of her co-workers
or supervisors observed her having any difficulty performing her job, and
Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence that she required any type of treatment
for her sprained ankle/foot (other than an open-toed walking cast), or the use of
195. Marx v. Arendosh Heating & Cooling, Inc., No. 2:20-CV-00338, 2020 WL
7425275, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 2020); see also Baker v. City of Washington, No. 2:19CV-00113-CCW, 2021 WL 2379709, at *12 (W.D. Pa. June 10, 2021) (citing Eshleman,
961 F.3d at 249) (“[C]ourts inquire on a case-by-case basis into several factors” to determine if
an impairment is minor).
196. See infra notes 197–98 and accompanying text.
197. Zick v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, No. 11 CIV. 5093(CM), 2012 WL
4785703, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2012) (emphasis added) (“Here, Plaintiff’s broken leg
had an expected duration of eight to ten weeks, as projected by her doctor . . . Thus, her
injury is ‘transitory’ or ‘minor’ and is not covered under the exception.”).
198. Quick v. City of Fort Wayne, No. 1:15-CV-056, 2016 WL 5394457, at *3 (N.D.
Ind. Sept. 27, 2016).
199. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(f) (2020).
200. See Bush v. Donahoe, 964 F. Supp. 2d 401, 423 (W.D. Pa. 2013).
201. Id.
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medication. There are no documented complaints of pain, nor evidence of the
effect, if any, of her impairment on her activities of daily living. 202

This reasoning seemingly contradicted what the court found regarding the
plaintiff’s actual disability claim, where the court characterized her injury
as a “severe sprain,” explicitly noting how it required her to wear the walking
boot.203 In particular, the court’s observation that the plaintiff showed no
“impairment on her activities of daily living” mirrors the Toyota preADAAA standard.204 The court in effect imported a functional limitation
test into the third prong that Congress purposefully eliminated.205
Some other cases use reasoning similar to the “one time occurrence”
cases discussed above regarding actual disability claims.206 An earlier Third
Circuit case rejected a police officer’s claim that his employer regarded
him as having an impairment based on what the officer characterized as
an “acute stress reaction with anxiety distress,” which the court noted in
a footnote was actually a suicide attempt.207 With no additional reasoning
other than citing the transitory and minor provision in the statute and the
objective standard for “minor,” the Third Circuit concluded that a “single
acute stress reaction [was] objectively transitory and minor.”208 The court

202. Id.
203. Id. at 416. The fact that the sprain required a walking boot was sufficient for
the court to conclude it “clearly” affected her musculoskeletal system under the major
bodily function subcategories of major life activities. Id.
204. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
205. There are also cases where the court explicitly insisted that, to prove a “regarded
as” claim, the plaintiff must show a substantial limitation of a major life activity. See, e.g.,
Ferrari v. Ford Motor Co., 826 F.3d 885, 893–94 (6th Cir. 2016) (concluding that the
plaintiff failed to present evidence that the employer regarded his opioid use as a substantial
limitation of any major life activity), abrogated by Babb v. Maryville Anesthesiologists
P.C., 942 F.3d 308 (6th Cir. 2019) (holding that “regarded as” plaintiffs need only establish
they were perceived to have an impairment, reasoning that “[t]o the extent [the court had]
issued decisions in recent years holding to the contrary—and, regrettably, [the court did]—
that was error”); Hohenstein v. City of Glenpool, No. 11-CV-0559-CVE-FHM, 2012 WL
1886510, at *6 (N.D. Okla. May 23, 2012) (“Even if the Court were to assume that
defendant regarded plaintiff as having a more permanent impairment, plaintiff must still
show that defendant mistakenly perceived her as having a substantially limiting impairment
that prevented her from performing a major life activity.” (citing Justice v. Crown Cork &
Seal Co., Inc., 527 F.3d 1080, 1086–87 (10th Cir. 2008)).
206. See, e.g., Michalesko v. Borough, 658 F. App’x 105, 107 (3d Cir. 2016) (concluding
a single suicide attempt was objectively transitory and minor); see also supra notes 86–90
and accompanying text.
207. Michalesko, 658 F. App’x at 107 & n.2.
208. Id. at 107.
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did not explain how a suicide attempt could be considered objectively
minor. The only basis for its decision appears to be that the employer fired
the officer after one such attempt, creating a rather perverse incentive for
employers to rid themselves of employees who experience a mental health
crisis rather than trying to assist them.209
A related problem arises when a plaintiff making a “regarded as” claim
actually has a short-lived impairment. There can be a disconnect when this
impairment itself is objectively transitory and minor, but the employer’s
subjective perception of the impairment was more substantial.210 The
EEOC anticipated the opposite situation where an employer would argue
that although it acted upon the employee’s actual impairment, it subjectively
thought that impairment was only transitory and minor:
A covered entity may not defeat “regarded as” coverage of an individual simply
by demonstrating that it subjectively believed the impairment was transitory and
minor; rather, the covered entity must demonstrate that the impairment is (in the
case of an actual impairment) or would be (in the case of a perceived impairment)
both transitory and minor.211

But the EEOC’s example does not explain how to resolve the situation
where a plaintiff has an impairment that resolves in six months or less and
appears minor in hindsight, but the employer treated it as longer lasting and
more significant at the time.212 In that circumstance, it is not clear if the
court should apply the objective standard for minor to the actual impairment
itself or to the impairment as the employer perceives it. If the latter, employers
could defeat a perceived disability claim despite the significance of what
they in fact perceived.
Some cases hold for the employer under those circumstances. For
example, the Northern District of Texas dismissed a “regarded as” claim
at summary judgment because it found a plaintiff’s episode of dehydration
and possible heat stroke actually lasted only a few hours and resulted in
only three days off work, after which the plaintiff received a clean bill of

209. See id. In a footnote, the Third Circuit suggested it did not mean to say that all
one-time occurrences were minor. See Eshleman v. Patrick Indus., Inc., 961 F.3d 242, 250
n.58 (3d Cir. 2020) (suggesting an organ transplant would “perhaps” be an example of a
non-minor one-time occurrence).
210. See, e.g., Willis v. Noble Env’t Power, LLC, 143 F. Supp. 3d 475, 484 (N.D. Tex.
2015) (addressing a case in which plaintiff’s impairment lasted only a short time but an
employer expressed concern about their employee’s ability to do their job safely in the future).
211. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(f) (2020).
212. See, e.g., Odysseos v. Rine Motors, Inc., No. 3:16CV2462, 2017 WL 914252,
at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 2017) (finding employer’s on-going questions about the plaintiff’s
heart and his health after he wore a heart monitor for a short time were sufficient to show
that the employer regarded the plaintiff as having more than a transitory and minor
impairment).
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health.213 The evidence showed the employer was concerned about the
plaintiff’s continuing ability to perform the job, which required climbing
over 300 feet and working in temperatures above 100 degrees safely in the
future.214 The court did not address those facts, only the length of time
the plaintiff’s condition actually lasted.215 Similarly, in two cases involving
H1N1—swine flu—the courts interpreted the EEOC regulation to look at
what was known about the impairment at the time the case was being
decided rather than evaluating what the employer perceived at the time.216
In the first case, the Middle District of Florida cautioned that:
The “transitory and minor” exception to the “regarded as prong” focuses on the
perceived impairment itself and not the condition giving rise to such impairment.
As a result, the fact that [the employer] and the healthcare community may have
viewed a potential H1N1 pandemic as quite serious is not relevant to a determination
of whether [the employer] perceived [the plaintiff] herself as seriously impaired
by the H1N1 virus.217

In the second case, the District of Minnesota emphasized it was evaluating
the significance of the impairment “as it is now understood,” and that the
objective standard “turns not on perception, but on reality.”218 In both cases,
the courts reviewed what was known about the seriousness of H1N1 symptoms
and complications at the time the case was decided and concluded that
H1N1 was not significantly different from the common flu, making it thus
only a transitory and minor impairment.219
The courts’ reasoning is contradicted by the hand wound example in the
Interpretive Guidance, which shows how the status of a claim depends on
what an employer perceives.220 According to that example, if an employer
perceives an otherwise minor hand wound as evidence of HIV infection,
then it is not a transitory and minor impairment as mistakenly perceived.221
213. Willis, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 484.
214. Id. at 477, 484.
215. See id. at 484.
216. Lewis v. Fla. Default L. Grp., P.L., No. 8:10-CV-1182-T-27EAJ, 2011 WL
4527456, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 16, 2011); Valdez v. Minn. Quarries, Inc., No. 12-CV0801, 2012 WL 6112846, at *3 (D. Minn. Dec. 10, 2012).
217. Lewis, 2011 WL 4527456, at *6 (citations omitted).
218. Valdez, 2012 WL 6112846, at *3.
219. See Lewis, 2011 WL 4527456 at *6 (“[Plaintiff] was unable to provide concrete
differences between the symptomatology of the seasonal flu virus and the H1N1 virus.”);
Valdez, 2012 WL 6112846, at *3 (concluding that the facts showed the H1N1 outbreak
had a mortality and hospitalization rate similar to seasonal influenza).
220. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(l) (2020).
221. Id.
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This suggests that the court should apply the objective test to the employer’s
underlying, if mistaken, concern. If the employer perceives the impairment
as one that could continue into the future, or one that could be more
substantial than it turned out to be, the employer has regarded the plaintiff
has having something more than a transitory or minor impairment.
Some cases have followed that line of reasoning in regard to employers
who condition employment on medical clearance or make other inquiries
concerning the individual’s future health.222 For example, the Ninth Circuit
reasoned that:
[i]n requesting an MRI because of [the plaintiff’s] prior back issues and conditioning his
job offer on the completion of the MRI at his own cost, [the employer] assumed
that [the plaintiff] had a “back condition” that disqualified him from the job unless
[he] could disprove that proposition. And in rejecting [his] application because it
lacked a recent MRI, [the employer] treated him as it would an applicant whose
medical exam had turned up a back impairment or disability. [The employer]
chose to perceive [the plaintiff] as having an impairment at the time it asked for
the MRI and at the time it revoked his job offer. 223

Similarly, the Western District of Michigan found an employer perceived
an employee as having a disability when it put her on a “medical hold,” even
though she passed a physical exam, because her medical records contained
information about possible impairments that may be aggravated in the
future.224
Too often, however, courts turn a blind eye to the reality of how employers
perceive plaintiffs.225 The Eleventh Circuit went so far as to state in one
case that “no matter what [the plaintiff] may be able to prove about how
[his employer] perceived his physical condition,” the plaintiff did not have
a “regarded as” claim because the actual length of the plaintiff’s impairment
was less than six months.226 The statute and regulations are not a model
of clarity on this issue, but the transitory and minor exception was intended
222. See Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. BNSF Ry. Co., 902 F.3d 916, 924 (9th
Cir. 2018) (concluding that the employer perceived the plaintiff as having an impairment
when it required him to obtain an MRI at his own cost); see also Odysseos v. Rine Motors,
Inc., No. 3:16CV2462, 2017 WL 914252, at *2–3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 2017) (finding that
the plaintiff stated a claim when the defendant repeatedly inquired into the plaintiff’s heart,
health, and plans for retirement after they wore a heart monitor for a short period of time).
223. BNSF, 902 F.3d at 924 (9th Cir. 2018).
224. E.E.O.C. v. M.G.H. Fam. Health Ctr., 230 F. Supp. 3d 796, 799, 808, 810 (W.D.
Mich. 2017); see also Odysseos, 2017 WL 914252, at *2–3 (finding an employer’s
repeated inquiries about the plaintiff’s heart and health were sufficient to state a claim that
the employer regarded him as having a disability that was not transitory and minor).
225. See, e.g., Weisel v. Stericycle Commc’ns Sols., No. 3:13-CV-3003, 2015 WL
390954, at *11 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2015) (reasoning that the employer perceived the plaintiff’s
gallbladder surgery itself as her impairment, which was a temporary condition, not the permanent
loss of her gallbladder function).
226. White v. Interstate Distrib. Co., 438 F. App’x 415, 420 (6th Cir. 2011).
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to be narrow and exclude only cases that fall on the lowest end of the
spectrum.227 It makes sense to limit the employer’s ability to use its subjective
perception as a defense because employers can be disingenuous about whether
they knew an impairment was more than transitory and minor. However,
the same rationale does not support allowing the employer to defeat claims
when the plaintiff can show the employer was treating her impairment as
something more than transitory and minor. To the contrary, the latter case
falls even more squarely within the overarching purpose for the “regarded
as” prong—to address stereotypes and assumptions about the abilities of
individuals with disabilities.228
The Western District of Texas reconciled the difference between an actual
impairment and an impairment perceived by the employer by applying the
objective standard to what the employer perceived.229 That court reasoned
“that the relevant inquiry is whether the shoulder injury perceived by [the
employer] to exist would be objectively transitory and minor, not by
determining whether [the employer] subjectively perceived or believed
that [his] shoulder injury was transitory and minor.”230 The court found that
the plaintiff had created an issue of fact from evidence that his employer
wanted him to get an MRI in order for him to return to work because they
had concerns about his ability to work safely.231
Moreover, at least one case has recognized the flaw in reading the
regulation to prohibit considering the employer’s subjective beliefs in every
case.232 The Northern District of Alabama found this interpretation to be
inconsistent with the very purpose of the revised section.233 As that court saw
it, the regulation closed a specific loophole, namely where the employer
argued it believed an actual impairment was transitory and minor regardless
of the objective facts showing otherwise.234 The court reconciled the regulation

227. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(l) (2020) (indicating the “transitory and minor”
exception is to be constructed narrowly); see also H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at 14
(2008) (expressing intent that the exception apply only to “claims at the lowest end of the
spectrum of severe limitations”).
228. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 30 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
445, 453 (describing the purpose of the regarded as prong).
229. Mesa v. City of San Antonio, No. SA-17-CV-654-XR, 2018 WL 3946549, at
*3 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2018).
230. Id. at *14.
231. Id. at *16.
232. See generally Nevitt v. U.S. Steel Corp., 18 F. Supp. 3d 1322 (N.D. Ala. 2014).
233. Id. at 1329.
234. Id. at 1331.
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by focusing on the plaintiff’s specific claim—did the employee’s actual
impairment result in the alleged discrimination, or was it the plaintiff’s
impairment as perceived by the employer?235 As the court observed, assessing
only the plaintiff’s actual disability when the employer perceives it as
something more substantial “would render the perceived impairment prong . . .
meaningless in all but the rare scenario where a perceived perception has
no basis in reality.”236 The court noted the Interpretive Guidance’s hand
wound example, and concluded it directed courts to consider what the employer
perceived even if the actual impairment was objectively minor and transitory.237
There is also an issue regarding what evidence the court considers
relevant to determine what the employer perceives. In some cases, courts
have allowed employers to narrow the perceived impairment to the plaintiff’s
medical treatment, which may be short-term, rather than the underlying
condition. For example, the Middle District of Pennsylvania reasoned that
the relevant “transitory and minor” inquiry was in regard to the employer’s
perception of the plaintiff’s gall bladder surgery, not the permanent loss
of an organ and the physical consequences thereof. 238 Similarly, the
Northern District of Ohio found that the employer was entitled to summary
judgment because the plaintiff did not present evidence that his recuperation
from back surgery lasted longer than six to eight weeks, despite the fact that
the surgery was the culmination of an ongoing back problem that had existed
for at least three years.239 By contrast, the Seventh Circuit concluded an
employer had not established that the plaintiff’s heart condition was transitory
when the evidence showed it was severe enough to require triple bypass
surgery.240 The employer wanted the court to focus on the surgery to show
it was transitory but the court characterized the surgery as the treatment,
not the impairment.241
235. Id. at 1329.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1331. Professor Befort identifies a related situation where the employer
takes an adverse action against an employee whose impairment is anticipated to last less
than six months but, after that action is taken, the impairment ends up lasting longer. See
Befort, supra note 73, at 1027 (suggesting the exception would apply). The answer should
depend on what the employer perceived. If everyone was mistaken, Professor Befort
is probably correct. If, however, the evidence shows that the employer fired the employee
because it feared the impairment would last longer than six months, this would not seem
to be the type of case that the exclusion was meant to address.
238. Weisel v. Stericycle Commc’ns Sols., No. 3:13-CV-3003, 2015 WL 390954, at
*11 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2015). But see Eshleman v. Patrick Indus., Inc., 961 F.3d 242,
250 n.62 (3d Cir. 2020) (criticizing a case for failing to treat minor and transitory as distinct
inquiries).
239. Neumann v. Plastipak Packaging, Inc., No. 1:11-CV-522, 2011 WL 5360705,
at *1, *11 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2011).
240. Silk v. Bd. of Trs., Moraine Valley Cmty. Coll., 795 F.3d 698, 706 (7th Cir. 2015).
241. Id.
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The ADAAA’s findings and purposes explicitly direct courts not to
engage in demanding examination of the question of disability.242 The
cases reading transitory and especially minor to set a more demanding standard
are inconsistent with that purpose.243 They are reminiscent of pre-ADAAA
cases that focused minutely on the nature of the impairment and not the
fact that the employer relied upon it in its decision making.244
D. Who Bears the Burden of Proof on Whether an
Impairment Is Transitory and Minor?
The ADAAA does not clearly state who bears the burden of addressing
the “transitory and minor” exception to the “regarded as” prong.245 The
EEOC treats it as an affirmative defense.246 A number of courts have

242. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(5), 122 Stat.
3553 (2008) (“[C]ongressional intent . . . to convey that the question of whether an individual’s
impairment is a disability under the ADA should not demand extensive analysis . . . .”).
243. See, e.g., Lewis v. Fla. Default L. Grp., P.L., No. 8:10-CV-1182-T-27EAJ, 2011
WL 4527456, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 16, 2011) (focusing on whether the employer perceived
the plaintiff as being “seriously impaired”).
244. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 490 (1999) (holding that
the employer did not regard the plaintiffs as substantially limited in their ability to work
because their vision limitations could be corrected using eyeglasses, and not considering
that the employer disqualified them from being a commercial airline pilot because it regarded
their eyesight as impaired), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub.
L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
245. See Mesa v. City of San Antonio, No. SA-17-CV-654-XR, 2018 WL 3946549,
at *12 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2018) (characterizing the statutory language as “not entirely
clear” on who bears the burden to prove whether an impairment is transitory and minor).
246. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(f) (2020). The regulation provides that:
It may be a defense to a charge of discrimination by an individual claiming
coverage under the “regarded as” prong of the definition of disability that the
impairment is (in the case of an actual impairment) or would be (in the case of
a perceived impairment) “transitory and minor.” To establish this defense, a covered
entity must demonstrate that the impairment is both “transitory” and “minor.”
Id.
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adopted the EEOC’s approach.247 Other courts fail to acknowledge it.248
In one case, the court acknowledged transitory and minor was an affirmative
defense that the defendant had failed to specifically plead, but then found
it was sufficient that the defendant denied the plaintiff had a disability in
its answer.249 Other courts, such as the Tenth Circuit, place the burden
directly on the plaintiff.250 That circuit has articulated a three-part test that
requires plaintiffs to show: “(1) he has an actual or perceived impairment,
(2) that impairment is neither transitory nor minor, and (3) the employer
was aware of and therefore perceived the impairment at the time of the
alleged discriminatory action.”251

247. See, e.g., Eshleman v. Patrick Indus., Inc. 961 F.3d 242, 246 n.25 (3d Cir. 2020)
(observing that the Third Circuit has “[f]ollow[ed] the EEOC’s lead” in describing the
issue as an affirmative defense); Silk v. Bd. of Trs. Moraine Valley Cmty. Coll., 795 F.3d
698, 706 (7th Cir. 2015) (reasoning that the defendant bore the burden of proving both
transitory and minor); Mesa, 2018 WL 3946549, at *13 n.13 (citing Burton v. Freescale
Semiconductor, Inc., 798 F.3d 222, 230 (5th Cir. 2015)) (concluding that the employer
must prove transitory and minor as a defense and suggesting that the Fifth Circuit agrees).
248. See Adair v. City of Muskogee, 823 F.3d 1297, 1306–07 (10th Cir. 2016) (articulating
a test which requires plaintiffs to allege a non-transitory and minor impairment without
referencing the EEOC affirmative defense regulation); see also Equal Emp. Opportunity
Comm’n v. BNSF Ry. Co., 902 F.3d 916, 922–23 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Adair for proposition
the plaintiff is required to show the alleged impairment was not transitory and minor);
Brtalik v. S. Huntington Union Free Sch. Dist., No. CV-10-0010, 2010 WL 3958430, at
*8 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2010) (“[P]laintiff . . . must at least show a disability that is not transitory
and minor.”).
249. See Treynor v. Knoll, Inc., No. 1:19-CV-753, 2021 WL 567438, at *5 (W.D. Mich.
Feb. 16, 2021) (“[T]here is no indication that [the transitory and minor exception] must be
expressly asserted as a defense at the pleadings stage; the Court could not find a case denying
the . . . defense on grounds of waiver.” (citing Eshleman, 961 F.3d at 246 n.25)).
250. Adair, 823 F.3d at 1310.
251. Id. In Adair, the Sixth Circuit corrected its earlier post-ADAAA decisions that
had continued to require plaintiffs in “regarded as” cases prove substantial limitation of
major life activities. See id. at 1305–06. Although the court in Adair correctly cited to the
ADAAA’s amended standards, it did not cite to the EEOC’s revised regulations identifying
transitory and minor as a defense. See id. at 1306–07; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(f) (2011)
(providing that the defendant must show an impairment is transitory and minor). District
courts in the Sixth Circuit have noted this failure to cite the relevant regulations but assumed
the burden would apply to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v.
UPS Ground Freight, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 3d 1270, 1285 (D. Kan. 2020) (“The Court assumes
without deciding that Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that his impairment was
not transitory and minor.”); Vannattan v. VendTech-SGI, LLC, No. 16-CV-2147-JWL,
2017 WL 2021475, at *5 (D. Kan. May 12, 2017) (“The Circuit appears to place the burden
of proof on the plaintiff to establish that his or her impairment is ‘not minor’ as part of the
plaintiff’s prima facie case. . . . Both the statute and implementing regulations, however,
seem to place the burden of proof on the employer to establish that the impairment
is minor. . . . The parties do not address this issue. Either way, the court cannot grant
summary judgment on the issue of whether plaintiff’s impairment is ‘minor’ because
defendants have raised that issue for the first time in their reply brief . . . .”).
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Even among the courts that seemingly agree transitory and minor is an
affirmative defense, a number nonetheless have required that it not be apparent
on the face of the complaint that the impairment was not transitory and
minor.252 The Third Circuit, acknowledging that the court had previously
called it an affirmative defense, indicated “a regarded-as plaintiff alleging
a transitory and minor impairment has failed to state a legally sufficient
claim, even if the employer does not include a transitory and minor defense
in its Answer.”253 Nonetheless, those courts seem to interpret “on the face
of the complaint” broadly in plaintiffs’ favor.254 For example, the Northern
District of Georgia found a complaint sufficient on its face when the
plaintiff alleged she had been hospitalized for one day for a “heart-related
event” caused by workplace stress. 255 The court reasoned that the heart
event did not suggest a minor condition, and it could not at that juncture
say the defendant had defeated the plaintiff’s “regarded as” claim. 256
Similarly, the Eastern District of New York concluded that the plaintiff’s
back injury as pled in the complaint was transitory because it resolved
within three months; however it was not minor because she had been
granted a leave of absence to recover.257
252. See, e.g., Budhun v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 765 F.3d 245, 259 (3d Cir.
2014) (“While ordinarily a party may not raise affirmative defenses at the motion to
dismiss stage, it may do so if the defense is apparent on the face of the complaint.”); Green
v. ADCO Int’l Plastics Corp., No. 1:17-CV-337-WSD-LTW, 2017 WL 8810690, at *10
(N.D. Ga. Dec. 27, 2017) (reasoning that the plaintiff does not have to plausibly plead
facts suggesting the transitory and minor defense fails, but allowing the complaint to
be dismissed if it is apparent on its face that the impairment was transitory and minor);
Mayorga v. Alorica, Inc., No. 12-21578-CIV, 2012 WL 3043021, at *8 (S.D. Fla. July 25,
2012) (“To the extent that this defense is apparent from the face of the complaint, it is an
appropriate basis for dismissing the claim that [the employer] regarded [the plaintiff] as
having a disability.”); Davis v. NYC Dep’t of Educ., No. 10-CV-3812, 2012 WL 139255,
at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2012) (denying a motion to dismiss because it was not apparent
on the face of the complaint that the plaintiff’s impairment was minor).
253. Eshleman v. Patrick Indus., Inc., 961 F.3d 242, 246 n.25 (3d Cir. 2020).
254. See id. at 246 n.25, 250 (finding the plaintiff plausibly alleged his employer
regarded his series of medically-related absences as a non-transitory and minor impairment);
Odysseos v. Rine Motors, Inc., No. 3:16CV2462, 2017 WL 914252, at *2–3 (M.D. Pa.
Mar. 8, 2017) (finding the employer’s repeated questions about plaintiff’s heart and health
condition were sufficient to state a plausible claim that the employer regarded him as
having a disabling heart condition, despite facts showing that the condition required medical
monitoring for less than six months); see also Adair, 823 F.3d at 1310–11.
255. Green, 2017 WL 8810690, at *10.
256. Id.
257. See Davis, 2012 WL 139255, at *6 (reasoning the plaintiff only needed to give
defendants fair notice of her claim).
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This all matters because the party who bears the burden of proof bears the
burden of presenting sufficient objective evidence.258 The Middle District
of Alabama granted an employer summary judgment on the plaintiff’s
claim that his employer terminated him due to his heart condition because
the plaintiff had not presented sufficient objective facts that the employer
perceived that heart condition “as anything but relatively short-term.”259
If the burden was properly placed on the defendant, the court’s inquiry
should have been not only whether the defendant presented sufficient facts
that the heart condition itself was objectively transitory and minor, but also
whether the condition as the employer perceived it also met that criteria.260
The Seventh Circuit recognized exactly that, holding, in another heart
condition case, that the defendant failed to meet its burden because “it ha[d]
provided no evidence as to how long such a condition would last. Likewise,
the [defendant] ha[d] presented no evidence to establish that such a condition
could be considered ‘minor.’”261
E. The Special Situation of Employers Who Perceive the Employee May
Develop a Disorder or Condition in the Future
Several circuit courts read the “regarded as” prong to require proof that
the employer regards the plaintiff as being currently impaired when taking
an adverse employment action.262 These courts characterize language in
the Act as using the present tense: “being regarded as having such an
impairment.”263 If this language indeed requires employers to perceive an
258. Richardson v. Koch Foods of Ala., LLC, No. 2:16-CV-00828-SRW, 2019 WL
1434662, at *2–3 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 29, 2019) (noting that the plaintiff did not present sufficient
objective facts regarding whether his employer perceived his heart condition as anything
other than short-term).
259. Id. at *7.
260. The court also characterized the plaintiff’s heart condition, which involved an
acute inferior wall infarction and surgery to place a stent, as “relatively routine.” See id. at *7.
261. Silk v. Bd. of Trs., Moraine Valley Cmty. Coll., 795 F.3d 698, 706–07 (7th Cir.
2015).
262. Shell v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 941 F.3d 331, 336 (7th Cir. 2019);
Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. STME, LLC, 938 F.3d 1305, 1315 (11th Cir. 2019);
Morriss v. BNSF Ry. Co., 817 F.3d 1104, 1113 (8th Cir. 2016); Equal Emp. Opportunity
Comm’n v. BNSF Ry. Co., 902 F.3d 916, 923 (9th Cir. 2018); see also Adair v. City of
Muskogee, 823 F.3d 1297, 1306 (10th Cir. 2016) (“The employer [must have] perceived
the impairment at the time of the alleged discriminatory action.”).
263. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C) (emphasis added); see also Shell, 941 F.3d at 336
(“The key word is ‘having’ . . . .”). Shell acknowledged a technical difference of opinion
about whether “having” as used in this context is a present participle or a gerund and came
down on the side of present participle. See id. (“To settle the technical debate, it is a
present participle, used to form a progressive tense.”). A similar argument has been made
in cases involving obesity. The majority of courts have held both pre- and post-ADAAA
that obesity is not itself an impairment unless it is the result of an underlying
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ongoing impairment, the employer’s actions fall outside of the Act if its
adverse employment actions are based on concerns about something that
could develop in the future.264 One court, for example, concluded that a
massage therapist did not state a “regarded as” claim although, after travelling
to Africa, her employer terminated her in fear that she had contracted
Ebola.265 The court reasoned that the statute protected against “a current,
past, or perceived disability—not . . . a potential future disability.”266
Besides creating a significant gap in ADA coverage for employment
decisions made on assumptions and stereotypes about the potential to
develop physical and mental impairments, this interpretation may present
physiological disorder. See, e.g., Merker v. Miami-Dade County Florida, 485 F. Supp. 2d
1349, 1351 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (“Courts have uniformly held that obesity is not a qualifying
impairment, or disability, unless it is shown to be the result of a physiological disorder.”),
superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 112 Stat.
3553 (2008), as recognized in Lowe v. Am. Eurocopter, LLC, 2010 WL 5232523 (N.D.
Miss. Dec. 16, 2010); Morriss, 817 F.3d at 1109 (concluding that it remains the case after
the ADAAA that obesity is not an impairment under the actual disability prong unless it
arises out of an underlying physiological disorder or condition). But see Equal Emp.
Opportunity Comm’n v. Res. for Hum. Dev., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 688, 695 (E.D. La.
2011) (finding in a pre-ADAAA case that the plaintiff did not have to prove her obesity
was the result of an underlying physiological condition). Plaintiffs have tried to work
around the physiological cause requirement by alleging that employers regard them as
being impaired due to the high risk of developing future medical conditions associated
with obesity. See, e.g., Moriss, 817 F.3d at 1113 (describing the plaintiff’s theory that the
defendant refused to hire him because the defendant perceived that his obesity posed an
unacceptable risk of future medical conditions). Courts have rejected those claims because
they required the plaintiff to show that the employer perceived them as having an existing
impairment. See id. (rejecting plaintiff’s perceived disability claim because the plaintiff
needed to show the employer perceived obesity as an existing physical impairment).
264. See STME, 938 F.3d at 1318 (concluding that the ADA required the plaintiff to
show that her employer regarded her as having an existing impairment).
265. Id. at 1310. The EEOC used the Dictionary Act to argue that words used in statutes
include the future tense unless context required otherwise. Id. at 1317. The statutory definition
was therefore broad enough to include an employer’s perception that an employee will
imminently contract Ebola. Id. The Eleventh Circuit refused to apply the Dictionary Act,
however, because it found no present tense verb in § 12102(3)(A) to carry into the future.
See id. at 1317–18. The court quoted 12102(3)(A) to show that it actually used only a
past tense verb, namely that the plaintiff “was subjected” to a prohibited action. See id. at
1314. Instead, it concluded that the natural reading of the statute required the plaintiff to
show the employer perceived her to have a current existing impairment. Id. at 1318. A
large part of the EEOC’s problem in that case was that its own guidance stated that impairments
do not include “characteristic predisposition to illness or disease.” See 29 C.F.R. app. §
1630.2(h) (2018); see also STME, 938 F. 3d at 1317 (discussing the EEOC guidance on
predisposition to illness and disease).
266. Id. at 1311.
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a gateway to considering the employer’s subjective perception outside of
the transitory and minor exception. For example, in one case, an employer
argued that it did not perceive an impairment as ongoing because the
employee was cleared to return to work.267 The court denied the EEOC’s
motion for summary judgment finding that there was a fact question based
on whether the employer perceived a current impairment.268 The court reasoned
that subjective awareness was a distinct question from the objective
determination of whether the impairment was transitory and minor.269
V. RESOLVING THE INCOHERENT COVERAGE OF
SHORT-TERM IMPAIRMENTS
The following two cases particularly illustrate the incoherence of current
ADA doctrine regarding short-term impairments. In the first case, the plaintiff
suffered a quadricep strain while participating in a corrections officers’
training academy.270 The court considered the impairment to be minor
because the strain did not stop him from participating in the training. 271
However, the court concluded it was not transitory, and his ADA claim
survived, because it took longer than six months for the strain to fully
heal.272 In the second case, the plaintiff alleged she suffered bleeding related
to a miscarriage but she returned to work the next day. 273 The court
acknowledged that pregnancy-related complications can meet the definition
of disability and that short-term impairments may satisfy the actual disability
prong if sufficiently severe, but concluded the ADA could not “be stretched
to cover a period of impairment lasting fewer than twenty-four hours . . . .”274
Although the former case involved a “regarded as” claim and the latter an
actual disability claim, the second plaintiff would have been in the same
situation had she tried to allege a “regarded as” claim under the ADAAA
267. See Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. UPS Ground Freight, Inc., No. 172453-JAR, 2020 WL 1984293, at *12 (D. Kan. Apr. 27, 2020) (“[T]he [c]ourt . . . must
find [the defendant] perceived a current impairment—perception of a past impairment that
has ended will not do. The fact that [the plaintiff] was released to work and worked for two
months with no perceived limitations is relevant to the timing of [the defendant]’s awareness.”).
268. Id. at *7–8.
269. Id. at *13.
270. Sherman v. County of Suffolk, 71 F. Supp. 3d 332, 338 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).
271. See id. at 346.
272. Id.
273. Love v. First Transit, Inc., No. 16-CV-2208, 2017 WL 1022191, at *6 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 16, 2017).
274. Id. Although the court quoted the plaintiff’s EEOC charge, in which it clearly
states that she miscarried, the court also criticized her for being vague about whether she
actually had a miscarriage. See id. at *1. Given the court’s emphasis on how the plaintiff
was absent from work only one day, nothing in the court’s reasoning suggests that it would
have found a miscarriage in and of itself sufficient. See id. at *6.
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because of the transitory exception. Thus, a “minor” muscle strain qualified
as a disability while a miscarriage did not, by the happenstance that one
lingered longer. There is no principled basis for this difference in protection.
Courts have reasoned that short-term impairments can be covered disabilities
but find an impairment’s short-term nature renders it not substantial enough.275
They reason there must be longer term complications, chronic effects, or
the possibility of recurrence.276 But if an impairment has ongoing complications,
or is chronic or episodic, then it is not a short-term impairment and the
other rules of construction, such as the episodic rule, would instead guide
the determination.277 For example, the Seventh Circuit recognized that, if
the episode was connected to a long-standing condition, the episodic rule
applied regardless of how short-term an acute episode might be.278 In other
words, when the plaintiff experiences an acute impairment that is tied to
a continuing condition, there is no reason for courts to consider duration;
instead, the only question is how impairing the acute episode was while it
was active. This is not the same question as whether a non-recurring shortterm impairment can meet the definition of an actual disability for purposes
of the ADA’s protections.
Some courts have correctly looked at the nature of the short-term limitations,
not their duration. For example, the Northern District of Alabama denied
a summary judgment motion that argued the plaintiff’s broken ankle was
only a non-covered temporary impairment, finding it sufficient that the injury
substantially limited major life activities—including standing, walking,

275. See, e.g., Mastrio v. Eurest Servs., Inc., No. 3:13-CV-00564, 2014 WL 840229,
at *4 (D. Conn. Mar. 4, 2014) (acknowledging the EEOC guidance that impairments
lasting less than six months can nonetheless be substantially limiting, but then reasoning
that the courts within that circuit “still adhere[] to the traditional notion” that temporary or
short-term impairments are not covered unless the disability is extremely severe).
276. See, e.g., Shaw v. Williams, No. 16-CV-1065, 2018 WL 3740665, at *9 (N.D.
III Aug. 7, 2018) (finding that the record lacked any evidence of lasting consequences or
impairments beyond the period during which the plaintiff recovered from an ankle injury).
277. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D) (stating the episodic rule). The mitigating measure
rule of construction would presumably also apply to circumstances where the length of recovery
is shortened by surgical intervention, medication, and therapies. See id. § 12102(4)(E)(i).
278. Gogos v. AMS Mech. Sys., Inc., 737 F.3d 1170, 1173 (7th Cir. 2013). In
Gogos, for about a month the plaintiff experienced high blood pressure spikes as well as
intermittent vision loss for a few minutes at a time. Id. at 1171. The court said that duration
was not relevant because these brief episodes were tied to the plaintiff’s longstanding
blood pressure condition. Id. at 1173. Instead, “the relevant issue is whether, despite their
short duration in this case, [the plaintiff’s] higher-than-usual blood pressure and vision
loss substantially impaired a major life activity when they occurred.” Id.
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and running—as well as major bodily functions such as musculoskeletal
function.279 The court concluded that “[t]he fact that the limitation was
temporary is irrelevant.”280 The court is correct.
Courts that categorically exclude impairments, such as broken limbs,
simply because a plaintiff might recover in six months or less are clearly
incorrect. The “regarded as” prong demonstrates that Congress knew what
language to use to impose a durational limitation on coverage. It did not
use such language in the first two prongs of the definition, which makes a
judicially constructed six-month threshold inappropriate. Even under the
“regarded as” prong, duration alone is not sufficient.281 The court must find
the impairment itself to have been minor.282 Courts in both actual and “regarded
as” cases should assess on an individualized basis the extent of the alleged
impairment while it was active.
In some of the cases rejecting short-term impairments, plaintiffs’ lawyers
may not have made strong litigation choices especially regarding the major
life activities they allege to be substantially limited. For example, in the transient
ischemic attack—TIA—case discussed earlier, the plaintiff alleged that
the TIA caused a substantial limitation of his ability to work.283 The court
may have had a harder time seeing the plaintiff’s limitations as substantial
because he did not allege any particular disruption in his work activities.284
At no point in the case were the ADAAA’s new major life activities,
namely limitations of major bodily functions, considered.285 The court
might have come to a different conclusion if the plaintiffs had presented
the TIA as a substantial limitation to his neurological function. The court
could still have concluded that the impairment was inadequate because it
did not recur.286 But, the plaintiff might have successfully used either the
279. Moore v. Jackson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 979 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1261 (N.D. Ala.
2013). The court noted that there was no dispute that the plaintiff experienced these limitations
while she was recovering from her broken ankle. See id. at 1259.
280. Id. at 1261.
281. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B) (defining an exception that requires showing that
the impairment was both transitory and minor).
282. Eshleman v. Patrick Indus., Inc., 961 F.3d 242, 248 (3d Cir. 2020) (setting out
factors for assessing whether an impairment is minor).
283. Feldman v. Law Enf’t Assocs. Corp., 955 F. Supp. 2d 528, 539 (E.D.N.C.
2013), aff’d on other grounds, 752 F.3d 339 (4th Cir. 2014).
284. See id. (noting that the plaintiff’s physician released him without any restrictions on
his activities).
285. See id.
286. Although the court in Feldman cited to a medical source that included a statistic
that one in three individuals who experience a TIA go on to have a stroke, the court
nonetheless referred to a TIA as an “acute condition that is different from the more chronic
conditions” the statute was intended to cover. Id. at 538 (citing Definition of Transient
Ischemic Attack (TIA), MAYO CLINIC (Mar. 7, 2020), http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/
transient-ischemic-attack/DS00220 [https://perma.cc/26MT-GRRQ]).
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episodic or remission rules of construction to focus on the physiological
aspects of a TIA and how it raises the risk of stroke and death, and not on
the more attenuated question of whether it interfered with his ability to
work.287 Asserting the new major bodily functions definition certainly does
not guarantee success,288 but it might make courts have to work harder to
justify their limiting approach.289
What the short-term impairment cases currently reflect is simply more
of the same. Although Congress intended to reverse the judicial backlash
against the scope of the ADA by eliminating the severity standard,290 the
cases show that when there is no explicit rule constraining them, courts will
continue to render decisions consistent with that backlash. The EEOC itself
has contributed to this. The amended statute does not say what role duration
plays in the substantial limitation assessment and the EEOC’s regulations
reinsert severity as the litmus test to determine substantial limitation when
the impairment’s duration is short-term.291 It is no surprise that courts then

287. Feldman cited the episodic rule, but it did not believe the rule applied because
it characterized a TIA as an acute condition unlike the chronic conditions it believed the
statute intended to cover. Id. (including a list of conditions such as cancer and epilepsy
characterized as chronic based on 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(vii)).
288. See, e.g., Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. UPS Ground Freight, Inc., No.
17-2453-JAR, 2020 WL 1984293, at * 2–3 (D. Kan. Apr. 27, 2020) (denying EEOC’s motion
to reconsider denial of its motion for summary judgment based on the allegedly undisputed
claim that the plaintiff’s stroke substantially limited his neurological and cardiovascular
systems).
289. For example, a court may find it more difficult to dismiss the significance of an
impairment because it does not impede the plaintiff’s ability to perform work-related
activities. See Martinez v. N.Y. Div. of Hum. Rts., No. 1:13-CV-1252-GHW, 2015 WL
437399, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2015) (emphasizing that none of the plaintiff’s medical
records established what specific activities plaintiff could not perform). Similarly, had the
plaintiff, who alleged he experienced depression, framed his claim as an impairment
of his neurological or brain function, the court may not have dismissed his claim so
easily for failing to allege any functional limitations caused by that depression. See Butler
v. BTC Foods Inc., No. 12-492, 2012 WL 5315034, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 2012); see
also Nicole Buonocore Porter, Explaining “Not Disabled” Cases Ten Years After the ADAAA:
A Story of Ignorance, Incompetence, and Possibly Animus, 26 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. &
POL’Y 383, 404 (2019) (suggesting that the plaintiff’s chances of success would have been
better if the court had considered impairment of major bodily function).
290. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–325, § 2(b)(4)–(5), 122
Stat. 3553 (2008) (rejecting Supreme Court precedent that required a severe level of restriction
and noting how the courts created an inappropriately high standard for proving limitation).
291. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) (2020); see also supra notes 63–65 and accompanying
text.
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apply the same substantial limitation analysis that they did pre-ADAAA,
sometimes by citing pre-ADAAA cases without attention to context.292
The approach most consistent with the ADAAA’s less demanding standards
is to evaluate short-term impairments based on their effects when active.
This is, of course, the rule of construction applied to impairments that are
episodic or in remission.293 It is also consistent with the plain meaning of
both terms. Congress did not define “episodic.” The Oxford English Dictionary
defines the term to mean “[o]f or pertaining to, or of the nature of, an episode;
incidental, occasional.”294 A person could have a skin condition that flares
up and resolves more than once over the course of less than six months,
which would make it episodic under that definition.
Even more on point, Congress also did not define “remission.” The
medical definition of that term recognizes that a remission can be “temporary
or permanent.”295 In a permanent, or complete, remission, a condition may
occur once, be treated so that no evidence of the condition or disease remains
in the body, and then never recur.296 Consider, for example, a localized
form of cancer that is removed with surgery followed by a short course of
chemotherapy and clean scans within six months.297 Whether the cancer
would recur is speculative and, through the new rules of construction, the
ADAAA rejects that speculation.298 What matters was how limiting the
cancer was when it was active. It should be no different for a broken bone
that needs surgery and rehabilitation even though the plaintiff is released
from therapy in less than six months.
Both the Interpretive Guidance and case law have cited to the legislative
reports for the proposition that the functional impairment in question to
be “important.”299 Courts have rejected as not sufficiently important: severe
292. See discussion supra Part III.B.
293. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D).
294. Episodic, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
295. Remission, WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD MEDICAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2008).
296. Cf. Understanding Cancer Prognosis, N AT ’ L C ANCER I NST. (June 17, 2019),
https://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/diagnosis-staging/prognosis [https://perma.cc/F5D9ZPQG] (discussing complete remission and how the passage of time effects the chances
of cancer returning).
297. The legislative history shows that the ADAAA’s proponents were particularly
concerned about case law finding cancer too temporary to be a substantial limitation. See
supra note 34 and accompanying text.
298. Some courts have suggested cancer surgery and treatment is sufficient to establish
the plaintiff’s ADA disability. See Angell v. Fairmount Fire Prot. Dist., 907 F. Supp. 2d
1242, 1251 (D. Colo. 2012) (“Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff was diagnosed with
cancer, and that he underwent surgeries and treatment for his cancer; therefore, Plaintiff
has adequately alleged that he had a disability under the ADA.”), aff’d, 550 F. App’x 596
(10th Cir. 2013).
299. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (2020) (“While the limitation imposed by
an impairment must be important, it need not rise to the level of severely restricting or
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pain, hospitalization and surgery, taking prescription medication, and wearing
casts, among other things.300 But again, the legislative history indicates
Congress only intended to eliminate those impairments that were at the
very bottom of the spectrum.301 The ADAAA did not intend to retain the
normative assessments of importance, or worth, that were prevalent in preADAAA decisions.302 The level of functional impairment when active is
what should matter; the length of time should not. The conceptual floor
identified in the original ADA legislative reports was a “simple infected
finger” that does not impair a major life activity.303 Both the courts and
the EEOC have been too quick to categorize other functional impairments
as trivial merely because they were short-term.
Specific to the “regarded as” prong, Congress initially intended to
eliminate consideration of functional impairments by eliminating the need
to prove “substantial” limitation but then re-injected this consideration by
directing courts to exclude transitory and minor impairments.304 What is
“minor” should be evaluated based on what the defendant perceives as the
active effects of an impairment.305 Congress was concerned that common
ailments, such as colds and the flu, would be covered without the transitory
significantly restricting the ability to perform a major life activity to qualify as a
disability.”); Bush v. Donahoe, 964 F. Supp. 2d 401, 416 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (“Although
Congress sought to abrogate the ‘significantly or severely restricting’ requirement as it
pertained to the ‘substantially limits’ factor of the ADA, the ADAAA still requires that
the qualifying impairment create an ‘important’ limitation.”).
300. See, e.g., Neumann v. Plastipak Packaging, Inc., No. 1:11-CV-522, 2011 WL
5360705, at *1, *9–11 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2011) (rejecting actual and “regarded as” claims
involving a back injury that caused severe pain and required surgery); Koller v. Riley Riper
Hollin & Colagreco, 850 F. Supp. 2d 502, 508, 513–14 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (granting the
defendant’s motion to dismiss where the plaintiff alleged that, after ACL surgery, he was
in pain, heavily medicated, and subsequently wore a cast that interfered with his ability to
move about and drive).
301. H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 2, at 18 (2008) (expressing intent that exception apply
only to “claims at the lowest end of the spectrum of severity”).
302. See Barry, supra note 19, at 279 (“The [ADAAA’s] ‘regarded as’ prong also
paves the way toward a broader conception of the social model of disability, one less likely
to lapse into the medical model’s ‘truly disabled’ approach. By defining ‘disability’ to include
just about everyone on the continuum of impairments, the ‘regarded as’ prong dissolves
the line between ‘disabled’ and ‘the rest of us.’”).
303. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990) (“A person with a minor, trivial
impairment, such as a simple infected finger is not impaired in a major life activity.”).
304. H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at 14 (2008).
305. See Nevitt v. U.S. Steel Corp., 18 F. Supp. 3d 1322, 1329–33 (N.D. Ala. 2014)
(reasoning that the employer’s perception must be taken into account where it viewed the
impairment as more than minor).
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and minor exception. 306 Courts have expanded the types of excluded
impairments far beyond that and disregarded the overriding exhortation
that the exception be construed narrowly.307
Circling back to this Article’s opening context, there is mounting
evidence that Covid-19 leaves long-term effects on the body, even after
seemingly minor or even asymptomatic cases.308 The “long haul” effects
on the lungs and other organs may be enough to convince some courts that
are otherwise hostile to short-term impairments.309 But it is likely that other
Covid-19 plaintiffs will encounter courts that dismiss their impairments
as a one-time occurrence or that give overriding weight to the fact the
plaintiff returned to work in less than six months. Courts may dismiss
Covid-related “regarded as” claims as transitory and minor for similar reasons,
by focusing on how long the infection actually lasted rather than on the
employer’s view that the impairment was more than trivial and short-term.
Those cases along with many others fall into the significant gaps in the
ADA’s protections that this Article identified.
VI. CONCLUSION
The ADA’s original goals included overcoming assumptions and stereotypes
about individuals with disabilities and eliminating barriers to employment
based on physical or mental impairments that can be reasonably accommodated
and do not pose an undue hardship on employers.310 The ADAAA reinforced
these goals by rejecting over a decade of unduly narrow judicial interpretation
of the definition of disability.311 Congress was clear that most disability
306.
307.
308.

H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at 14 (2008).
Id.
FAIR HEALTH, A DETAILED STUDY OF PATIENTS WITH LONG-HAUL COVID: AN
ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE HEALTHCARE CLAIMS 1 (2021) (finding that 23.2% of almost two
million patients reviewed had a persistent or new condition more than four weeks after
being diagnosed with Covid-19, including 19% of patients who had been asymptomatic).
309. To encourage such conclusions, the Departments of Justice and Health and
Human Services issued a guidance stating that “long COVID can be a disability” under
the federal statutes over which those agencies have jurisdiction. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS., GUIDANCE ON “LONG COVID” AS A DISABILITY UNDER THE ADA SECTION
504, AND SECTION 1557, at 1 (2021). The guidance sets out several examples of longhaul symptoms that would be substantially limiting but tellingly does not address how long
these symptoms would have lasted. See id. at 2–3.
310. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2), (7), (8) (articulating the serious and pervasive
problem of discrimination against individuals with disabilities and the need to ensure equal
opportunities in employment and protect other civil rights); id. § 12101(b)(1) (expressing
the ADA’s purpose to eliminate discrimination based on disability); id. § 12112(b)(5)(A)
(defining discrimination to include not making reasonable accommodations unless those
accommodations pose an undue hardship on the employer).
311. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-325, § 2(b)(2)–(5), 122 Stat.
3553 (2008).
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claims should require limited scrutiny of whether the plaintiff has a disability
and instead focus on the merits of the defendant’s adverse actions. 312
Unfortunately, while Congress included specific rules of construction directing
courts how to address things like mitigating measures and episodic impairments,
it left coverage of shorter term impairments unclear. Courts have taken
advantage of that lack of clarity to engage in a mini backlash of sorts.313
Impairments less than six months in duration either face per se exclusion
or must meet a severity test that mirrors rejected pre-ADAAA standards.
This goes beyond eliminating only those claims at the very bottom end of
the spectrum.
There is no coherent explanation for why the length of an impairment is
the most important determinant of whether someone subjected to discrimination
based on that impairment is protected under the ADA. The legislative history
makes only vague reference to the business community’s concerns about
“misapplication of resources” unless claims at the lowest end of the severity
spectrum are excluded.314 Perhaps it would be a misapplication of resources
for an employer to have to accommodate the common cold or mild allergies
or a hangnail, the types of ailments referenced in the debate.315 They are
not impairments that lead to adverse employment actions absent highly
unusual situations.316 But as to other fairly common impairments discussed
in this Article that do frequently result in adverse employment actions,
things like broken limbs, kidney stones, and miscarriages, the fact that they
may occur more commonly and resolve more quickly than other covered
impairments does not result in any less discriminatory stigma when they
are the basis for those adverse actions. When an employer acts adversely
based on an individual’s physical or mental impairment, or the employer’s
perception of such an impairment, the harm experienced by the individual
cannot be meaningfully distinguished merely because that individual ultimately
recovered from that impairment in a relatively brief time.

312. See id. § 2(b)(5).
313. Cf. Porter, supra note 289, at 388 (summarizing the backlash theory which
demonstrated that courts were deliberately construing the ADA narrowly out of hostility to the
potential scope of the protected class).
314. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 2, at 18 (2008).
315. 154 CONG. REC. H6064 (daily ed. June 25, 2008) (statement of Rep. Nadler)
(referencing concerns expressed about the ADA covering stomachaches, the common cold,
mild seasonal allergies, or even a hangnail).
316. As Representative Nadler stated in his comments during the floor debate, “I
have yet to see a case where the ADA covered an individual with a hangnail.” Id.
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Congress intended the ADAAA to exclude only truly trivial impairments.317
Congress or the EEOC should clarify how narrow that exception was intended
to be—the “hangnail” exception discussed in the legislative history.318
Otherwise, we continue to give courts the power to decide which disabilities
are deserving of protection under anti-discrimination law, and they have
not shown themselves to be good stewards of that decision.

317. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1989), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 334.
318. 154 CONG. REC. H6064 (daily ed. June 25, 2008) (statement of Rep. Nadler).
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